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In this dissertation, I describe two studies related to investors’ perceptions about 
management disclosures.  
In the first study, I use a variant of Dye and Sridhar (2004) to show analytically 
that investor uncertainty about managers’ reporting incentives to manipulate 
information reduces the degree to which accounting reports should weight 
manipulable information.  I also predict and show experimentally that greater weight 
on manipulable information in the face of incentive uncertainty harms investor welfare 
more than predicted by equilibrium analyses, by hindering managers’ and investors’ 
ability to predict one another’s strategies.  The resulting deviations from equilibrium 
cause the perceived and actual value-relevance of financial reports to vary over time in 
predictable (and testable) ways. 
In the second study, I report an experiment that examines how investor affect 
might influence investors’ perceptions of management disclosure credibility. Based on 
accounting and psychology literature, I predict that investors in a positive affective 
state will assess a higher level of management disclosure credibility due to positive 
interpretation and heuristic processing of information, and this tendency will be 
mitigated by their awareness of management reporting incentives. The results show 
that, inconsistent with prior evidence, positive affect does not lead to higher 
assessments of management disclosure credibility. Instead, positive affect is associated 
with a more systematic information-processing strategy. The results suggest that the 
 psychology literature on affect need to be refined to be applied in a management 
disclosure setting.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Incentive Uncertainty, Relevance, and Reliability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Accounting regulators seek to make financial statement information both relevant 
and reliable, but recognize that these two goals often conflict (SFAC No. 2, FASB 
1980). Recent moves toward fair value accounting in both domestic and international 
reporting suggest that regulators believe the relevance of fair value measures 
outweighs the unreliability that arises from the noise and bias inherent in many value 
estimates.   
Dye and Sridhar (2004, hereafter “DS”) provide a game-theoretic framework that 
is useful for identifying the extent to which accounting reports should include 
information that (like a fair value estimate) is not only known privately by managers, 
but is also manipulable by them.  In this paper, I modify their model to show that 
investors’ uncertainty about managers’ reporting incentives reduces the extent to 
which estimates should be included in financial reports in equilibrium, if regulators 
seek to maximize investor welfare.  I also use a disequilibrium analysis to show that 
incorporating manipulable estimates into financial reports in the presence of high 
incentive uncertainty is likely to impair investors’ ability to assess the usefulness of 
the reports. I confirm these predictions in a laboratory experiment. 
In both my model and DS, a firm reports a weighted average of a non-manipulable 
signal and a manipulable signal (which, in the absence of manipulation, would provide 
incremental information to investors). I extend DS by assuming that investors have 
imperfect information about the benefits of manipulation to the manager. This 
“incentive uncertainty” implies that investors cannot perfectly undo the manager’s 
manipulation, as they can in DS.  In equilibrium, greater incentive uncertainty lowers 
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the value-relevance of reports, and also lowers the weight on the manipulable signal 
that maximizes the value-relevance of the report in equilibrium (and consequently 
maximizes investor welfare).  Incentive uncertainty induces a trade-off between 
relevance and reliability that is similar to that discussed by accounting regulators: too 
much weight on the manipulable information reduces the reliability of the aggregated 
report, and consequently compromises the value-relevance of the aggregated report.  
I also conduct a disequilibrium analysis by assuming that players use iterated 
deletion of dominated strategies (IDD), also called “rationalization,” to narrow the set 
of feasible strategies, and then choose arbitrarily from those remaining sets. This 
analysis shows that greater incentive uncertainty and greater weights on manipulable 
information increase the size of the rationalizable sets, suggesting that players’ 
expectations of one another’s strategies are likely to be less accurate (as in Bloomfield 
1995, 1997).  These expectation errors result in disequilibrium outcomes that harm the 
welfare of investors by reducing their ability to value the firm accurately. 
The predictions of the disequilibrium analysis depend crucially on its assumptions 
about how players select strategies, which may well be inaccurate.  I test these 
predictions by conducting an experiment in which pairs of students play the reporting 
game in four settings.  I manipulate two variables: investor uncertainty in managerial 
reporting incentives, and the weight of managerial estimates in the aggregated report. 
The experimental results show that the managers’ and the investors’ welfare losses 
due to inaccurate expectations of their opponent’s strategy increase with weight on the 
manipulable information and with the uncertainty in management reporting incentives.  
High weight on manipulable information also impedes investors’ ability to predict 
managers’ reporting strategies, although, high incentive uncertainty does not. This 
mixed result arises because players do not choose strategies arbitrarily from within the 
rationalizable sets, as assumed by the disequilibrium analysis. Instead, they tend to 
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avoid high-risk strategies.  When incentive uncertainty is high, investors avoid risk by 
reducing their reliance on reports, and managers avoid risk by responding less strongly 
to their incentives for manipulation.  These patterns of behavior improve expectation 
accuracy, although investors’ welfare is still substantially below equilibrium levels on 
average. 
Overall, the results suggest that incentive uncertainty dramatically reduces the 
extent to which regulators should incorporate fair value and other manipulable 
information into financial reports, because of both their equilibrium effects and their 
tendency to cause disequilibrium outcomes. The results also provide testable 
hypotheses: the actual and perceived reliability of financial reports are likely to vary 
more over time, and be more misaligned with each other, when more manipulable 
information is incorporated in financial reports.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model of the 
manager and investors and derives predictions of behavior based on the notion of 
strategic dependence. Section III describes the experiment. Section IV analyzes the 
experimental results. Finally, section V provides the conclusion. 
 
II. MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section I first describe the specification of the model (players, information, 
actions and incentives).  I next describe the equilibrium, in which the manager and 
investor each behave optimally given the behavior of the other.  I then describe the 
disequilibrium analysis, which assumes that players apply a process of rationalization 
to select strategies.  Finally, I present hypotheses derived from the disequilibrium 
analysis. 
Specifications of Model  
As in the DS model, information about the firm’s net assets comes from a non-
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manipulable signal and the manager’s claim about a manipulable signal. The manager 
privately observes the manipulable signal of the net assets and needs to determine the 
amount to report on the balance sheet.   
Value and Information.  The economic value of the firm’s net assets,ω% , follows a 
normal distribution with a publicly known mean ω and variance 2ωσ .  The non-
manipulable signal of the firm’s net assets provides a noisy measure of the economic 
value of the firm’s net assets, hω ω δ= + %% % , where δ%  follows a normal distribution with 
mean zero and variance 2δσ .  
The manager also makes a claim mω  after observing another measure of the firm’s 
net assets, f ωω ω ε= +% % , where ωε%  is a normal random variable independent of the non-
manipulable signal, with mean zero and variance 2εσ .  
The firm’s reported net assets are determined by a weighted average of the 
manager’s reported manipulable signal and the non-manipulable signal of the firm’s 
net assets according to the equation (1 )m hr λω λ ω= + − , where λ  can be viewed as the 
portion of the manipulable measure in the firm’s balance sheet. Investors are assumed 
not to be able to disaggregate the manipulable and non-manipulable signals. 
The model setup can be mapped into the framework in Maines and Wahlen (2005). 
The non-manipulable signal captures the measurement attribute of a historical cost 
measure and the manipulable (and therefore potentially less-reliable) signal captures 
the measurement attribute of a fair value measure. The optimal choice of λ  represents 
the optimal extent to which regulators should choose to incorporate fair value. The 
optimal λ  also reflects the optimal trade-off between relevance and reliability.  
Note that my model assumes that, since accounting policies are public knowledge, 
the aggregator λ  is assumed to be known to investors. Despite investors’ knowledge 
about λ , I assume that investors are unable to differentiate between the non-
manipulable and manipulable components of accounting reports. As Sunder (1997) 
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points out, in the process of aggregation, accountants add their knowledge and 
judgments about similarities and dissimilarities of various accounts. Each line in the 
accounting report is an aggregation of various inputs and accounting experts’ 
knowledge. Investors often lack the expertise to disaggregate financial reports to more 
or less reliable items.1   
Actions and Incentives.  The manager incurs an expected cost of 2[( ) ]
2 m f
c E ω ω−  
for stating an estimate that is higher or lower than the objective information suggests, 
where c is a fixed positive constant. The cost to manipulate can reflect regulatory 
costs, reputation cost, the degree of slack in the firm’s financial position that can be 
used to manipulate the balance sheet, and personal effort of manipulation.  
I extend DS by relaxing the assumption that the manager’s incentives are fixed and 
known by investors. Instead, in my model, the manager’s incentives to manipulate the 
firm’s financial reports are uncertain and cannot be communicated to investors 
credibly. This change allows my model to reflect investors’ uncertainty over whether a 
given report reflects optimism or pessimism (perhaps because managers are setting up 
‘cookie-jar’ reserves that provide slack to report optimistically at a later date).2 
Specifically, I assume that the manager receives a payoff proportional to the 
                                                 
1
 Even at the individual account level, investors often face difficulty in disaggregating an 
accounting item to components with different degrees of manipulability. For example, FASB Statement 
No. 123, Share-Based Payment, requires companies to measure the cost of employee services received 
in exchange for an award of equity instruments based on the grant-date fair value of the award. It 
specifies that if an observable market price is not available for a share option with the same or similar 
terms and conditions, the fair value of that instrument must be estimated. In estimating the fair value, a 
company must choose a valuation model, and must develop reasonable and supportable estimates for 
each assumption used in the model. Given the complexity, investors are unlikely to disentangle the 
contributions of different inputs in determining the estimated fair value. 
2
 To focus on the interaction between the manager and investors, I also assume that the investment 
level is determined exogenously, rather than chosen by the manager as in DS. This simplification does 
not affect the nature of the interaction between the manager’s reporting decision and investors’ use of 
the firm’s financial reports. When investment is assumed to be endogenous, it is determined purely by 
investors’ reliance on the aggregated report. Thus, the results in this paper can be readily extended to an 
investment setting. 
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investors’ estimate of the firm’s net assets, emω , where m  is an incentive multiplier 
that captures the sensitivity of the manager’s payoff to the investors’ estimate of the 
firm’s performance, eω . m%  is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean 
zero3 and variance 2mσ . The realization of m%  is only observed by the manager and 
cannot be credibly communicated to other people. Allowing for variation in this 
incentive (including both positive and negative values) reflects the fact that firms 
sometimes have incentives to inflate reported assets, and sometimes have incentives to 
deflate them, and that firms may have incentives to inflate or deflate reported assets to 
different extent. The magnitude of the multiplier can be affected by multiple factors, 
such as the proportion of stock-based compensation in the manager’s incentive scheme 
and the sensitivity of market valuation of firm performance to the firm’s financial 
reports.  
The investors estimate the firm’s performance based on the aggregated report of 
the firm’s net assets. As in DS, I assume that the investors use a linear function of the 
form  ( )e r a brϖ = +  to arrive at their evaluation of the firm’s performance.  (I prove 
in Appendix I.F. that a pricing function that is linear in r is an optimal response to a 
reporting function that is linear in b).  
Best Response Functions and Equilibrium  
The manager’s strategy can be characterized as choosing an “adjustment factor,” 
denoted θ  (θ  > 0), which is multiplied by m to determine the difference between 
mω and fω .  A high adjustment factor implies that the manager’s report is highly 
sensitive to the realization of the manager’s (random) incentive. To identify the 
optimal choice of θ  given the investors’ level of reliance b, note that the manager’s 
payoff is 2( ) ( )
2
c
m a br mθ+ − , and (solving for the first-order condition) the 
                                                 
3
 The assumption that m% has a mean of zero is not crucial to the qualitative aspects of the results.   
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manager’s best reporting strategy is ( , )m
mb
m
c
ω ω ω
λ
ω ω ε ω ε θ ω ε= + + = + + . 
Therefore, the manager’s best response function *θ  can be written as:  
 
* ( ) bb
c
λθ =  (1) 
The manager’s best response function * ( )bθ  increases linearly in his expectation 
of investors’ reliance on the report. As expected reliance increases, the manager 
benefits more by manipulating more of his information, ceteris paribus. An increase in 
the weight on the manipulable signal, as measured byλ , increases the optimal level of 
manipulation for each expected level of reliance. Similarly, a decrease in the reporting 
cost increases the optimal level of manipulation for each expected level of reliance.  
The investors’ strategy can be characterized as choosing an intercept term, a, and a 
slope term, b, which when multiplied by the reported value r determines a valuation of 
the firm’s net assets. The optimal intercept term is always 0, given the assumption that 
ω
 and m are drawn from a distribution with a mean of 0.  Therefore, my analysis 
focuses on the slope term, b, which represents the investors’ reliance on the report.  
For any adjustment factor, θ , the investors’ best response can be represented as
 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2*( ) (1 ) m
b ω
ω ε δ
σθ
σ λ σ λ σ λ σ θ= + + − +  (2) 
where a and b are as in the investors’ linear evaluation model ( )e r a brω = + . The last 
term in the denominator of * ( )b θ , 2 2 2mλ σ θ , indicates the effect of the expected level 
of manipulation on the investors’ reliance. An increase in the adjustment factor 
decreases the investors’ optimal level of reliance because the reported net assets 
contain more of management manipulation. The optimal level of reliance is always 
non-negative and bounded from above by the informational value of the report in the 
absence of any manipulation. An increase in λ  or an increase in the manager’s 
 8 
reporting uncertainty 2mσ  decreases the optimal level of reliance for every level of 
manipulation the investors expect. 
Incentive uncertainty qualitatively alters investors’ best response function, relative 
to DS.  In DS, the manager’s certain incentive allows investors to know exactly how 
much the manager has altered the report, and therefore allows investors to undo the 
manipulation by adjusting the intercept to the valuation model. In the presence of 
incentive uncertainty, however, investors cannot know exactly how much the manager 
has altered the report, or in which direction. As a result, investors reduce the slope of 
the model, effectively viewing the report as less value-relevant, with perceived value-
relevance decreasing with increasing expectations of adjustment. 
Figure 1.1 depicts an example of the manager and investors’ best responses. The 
level of adjustment factor θ  is shown on the X-axis, and the level of reliance b is 
shown on the Y-axis.  The level of reliance ranges from 0% to 100%, and the level of 
adjustment factor ranges from 0 to infinity.  For ease of presentation, I report the level 
of adjustment factor as a percentage of 5 throughout the paper (e.g., an adjustment 
factor of 3 is reported as 60%), because 5 is significantly higher than any reasonable 
level of adjustment factor in the numerical examples used in the paper and experiment. 
The downward sloping line depicts the investors’ optimal reliance b*(θ) on the 
aggregated report for every level of adjustment factor θ. The investors’ optimal 
reliance on the report increases as the investors’ belief of the adjustment factor 
decreases. The upward sloping line depicts the manager’s optimal magnitude of 
adjustment factor θ*(b) for every level of the investors’ reliance b on the aggregated 
report. The optimal adjustment factor increases as the manager’s belief of the 
investors’ reliance increases. When both the manager and investors have correct 
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FIGURE 1.1 
Example of Best Responses 
This figure shows an example of the manager and investor’s best responses. The X-
axis depicts the level of the investor’s reliance, and the Y-axis depicts the level of the 
manager’s adjustment factor. The downward sloping line depicts the investor’s optimal 
reliance b*(θ) on the aggregated report for every level of adjustment factor θ*. The 
upward sloping line depicts the manager’s optimal adjustment factor θ*(b) for every 
level of the investor’s reliance on the aggregated report. The intersection of the two 
best response functions indicates the rational expectations equilibrium ( ,RE REbθ ). 
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beliefs about their opponents’ strategies and play the best responses to their beliefs, 
they are at the rational expectations equilibrium indicated by the intersection of the 
two best response curves.  
Formally, the rational expectations equilibrium is defined as follows: 
Definition 1. An equilibrium relative to the aggregation rule λ  consists of a 
valuation equation eω (.) and a reporting function mω (.) such that: 
(i) The reporting rule mω (ω , ωε ) maximizes 
2[ (1 ) ] ( )
2e m h m f
c
mω λω λ ω ω ω+ − − − ; 
(ii) The valuation rule eω (.) satisfies [ ] [ | ]e r E rω ω= %  for each 
report r. 
This definition of equilibrium requires that the manager chooses the adjustment 
factor that maximizes his payoff given investors’ valuation model, and that the 
investors choose the valuation model that minimizes their estimation error given the 
manager’s adjustment factor.  Given this definition, the unique linear equilibrium is 
given in the following proposition.  
Proposition 1. For any aggregation rule  [0,1]λ ∈  , there is a unique linear 
equilibrium given by  
(i) [ ] ( )e r a brω = + , where 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 )m
b ω
ω ε δ
σ
σ λ θ σ λ σ λ σ= + + + −  and 
0a = ; 
(ii) The manager’s equilibrium report is given by ( , )m mω ωω ω ε θ ω ε= + + , 
where ( ) bb
c
λθ = . 
(See Appendix I.A. for a Proof of Proposition 1.) 
A hypothetical regulator seeking to maximize investor welfare in equilibrium will 
choose a value of λ , denoted *λ , that maximizes the equilibrium level of b, which 
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measures the value-relevance of the report (Appendix I.E. proves the optimal λ  that 
maximizes the equilibrium b also maximizes the investor welfare). Appendix I.B. 
shows that an increase in incentive uncertainty causes a decrease in *λ . An increase 
in incentive uncertainty decreases the reliability of the report for each level of 
management manipulation and effectively reduces the value-relevance of the report. 
Thus, the regulator seeking to maximize the value-relevance of the report will reduce 
the weight on the manipulable information to suppress the manager’s incentive to 
misreport. The discussion above highlights the key difference between my model and 
DS. In my model, with incentive uncertainty, the optimal incorporation of estimates in 
the report reflects a trade-off between relevance and reliability, as opposed to DS, 
where *λ  is unaffected by reliability due to a fixed reporting incentive.  
Disequilibrium Behavior and Strategic Dependence  
Having characterized equilibrium outcomes, I now examine forces that might 
make equilibrium more or less difficult to achieve. The rational expectations 
equilibrium requires both the manager and investors to accurately predict one 
another’s strategies. However, many game theorists have argued that players will 
develop accurate expectations only if there is some process that leads them to do so 
(Binmore 1987). For my analysis, I assume that players use the process of 
“rationalization”, which is equivalent to the process of “iterated deletion of dominated 
strategies" (IDD) in my setting (Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984), to eliminate all but a 
set of feasible strategies.  
In rationalization, players iteratively restrict their choices by eliminating actions 
that are not the best response to at least one possible strategy not yet eliminated by the 
other player.  To formalize this, let B denote all possible choices of b, and let H 
represent all possible choices of θ .  Then define the operator R(.) to indicate the set of 
all best responses to a set of strategies.  Let B0 = R(H) denote the set of values of b 
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that are not eliminated by the first application of this rule, and let H0 = R(B) denote the 
set of values of θ  that are not eliminated by the first application of this rule.  In 
successive iterations of this thought process, each player eliminates strategies that are 
not the best response to any choice of the other player that has not been eliminated in a 
previous iteration.  Thus, H1 is the set of strategies that are best responses to some 
element of B0, and B1 is the set of strategies that are best responses to some element of 
H0. Generalizing this process, HK is the set of strategies that are best responses to 
some element of BK-1, and BK is the set of strategies that are best responses to some 
element of HK-1.  The index K can be viewed as the “degree” of rationality of the 
players. An infinite value of K represents common knowledge of rationality. 
Following Bloomfield (1995, 1997), I refer to the size of the set that remains after a 
given number of rounds as a measure of the “strategic dependence” of the game.  
To establish formally that increases in incentive uncertainty and weight on 
manipulable information increase strategic dependence, I calculate the product of the 
slopes of the best response functions at the equilibrium. If the best response functions 
were both straight lines, rationalization would eliminate all but the equilibrium 
outcome if the product of the slopes of the best response functions was smaller than 1. 
Even though the best response functions are not straight lines, the product of the 
slopes at equilibrium still serves as a good indicator of the degree of strategic 
dependence, especially near the equilibrium. I find that an increase in incentive 
uncertainty and weight (when the manipulable information is sufficiently informative) 
increases this measure of strategic dependence, and therefore should make equilibrium 
more difficult to achieve. This result is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. The product of the slopes of the best response functions increases 
with incentive uncertainty, 2mσ . The product of the slopes of the best response 
functions increases with weight, λ , when the manager’s information is sufficiently 
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informative. (See Appendices I.C. and I.D. for proofs).  
To illustrate how the power of rationalization to eliminate strategies can vary with 
characteristics of the reporting game, Figure 1.2 shows four scenarios of the best 
response functions where 2ωσ  is set to 100 and c  is set to 0.2. The same four scenarios 
are used in the experiment. The weight on management report (λ ) is 40% in Scenarios 
A and B, and 80% in Scenarios C and D. The incentive multiplier (m) has a standard 
deviation of 5 in Scenarios A and C, and 15 in Scenarios B and D. For the ease of 
illustration, 2εσ  and
2
δσ  are set to 0, implying that both the manipulable and non-
manipulable signals are perfect representations of the economic value of the firm’s net 
assets.  This dramatically simplifies the explanation of the task given to participants 
(who play the games depicted in Figure 1.2), and does not substantially alter the 
qualitative aspects of the analysis4.  Because the manipulable estimate adds no 
information to the non-manipulable information, the lack of noise implies that the 
optimal weight on the management report is zero in all games; this assumption 
therefore eliminates a potential source of variation across settings, which is not the 
focus of this study. 
Figure 1.2 depicts how the process of rationalization determines the accuracy of 
expectations in four parameterizations of the model. In scenario A, both the weight on 
the manager’s report and the incentive uncertainty are low, resulting in low strategic 
dependence. The investors prefer relatively high reliance even if their expectation of 
the manager’s adjustment level is high, while the manager prefers a relatively low 
adjustment level even if his expectation of the investors’ reliance is high. As a result, 
                                                 
4
 Setting 2εσ  and
2
δσ  to zero does not change the manager’s best response function. It does reduce 
the slope of the investors’ best response, and therefore slightly reduces strategic dependence. However, 
the qualitative predictions of the model are not changed. In particular, all the proofs provided in the 
Appendices are based on the general model with non-zero 2εσ  and 
2
δσ . 
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FIGURE 1.2 
 
Four Scenarios of Strategic Dependence 
 
This figure shows four scenarios of strategic dependence that are used in the 
experiment. For each scenario, the X-axis depicts the level of the investor’s reliance, 
b, and the Y-axis depicts the level of the manager’s adjustment factor, θ. The 
downward sloping line depicts the investor’s optimal reliance b*(θ) on the aggregated 
report for every level of the manager’s adjustment factor θ*. The upward sloping line 
depicts the manager’s optimal level of adjustment factor θ*(b) for every level of the 
investor’s reliance on the aggregated report. The intersection of the two best response 
functions indicates the rational expectations equilibrium ( ,RE REbθ ).The value of the 
firm’s net asset is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 10. 
Both 2εσ  and
2
δσ are zero. The incentive multiplier, m, has a standard deviation of 5 in 
scenario A and scenario C and 15 in scenario B and scenario D. The weight on the 
manager’s adjustment is 40% in scenario A and scenario B and 80% in scenario C and 
scenario D.  
The shaded areas show zero- and first-order rationalization for both the manager 
and investor. The areas shaded with     and     indicate the manager’s strategies that are 
eliminated in the zero- and first-order rationalization. The areas shaded with     and     
contain the investor’s strategies that are eliminated in the zero- and first-order 
rationalization. Infinite iterations of the rationalization process reduce the 
rationalizable sets to zero in scenarios A, B and C with a much slower speed for 
scenario C. Infinite iterations of the rationalization process leaves the rationalizable set 
to a range for scenario D. Strategic dependence is the lowest in scenario A and the 
highest in scenario D.  
Bi denotes the set of reliance that remains after ith-order rationalization. Hi denotes 
the set of adjustment factor that remains after ith-order rationalization. Product of the 
best response curves at equilibrium is a measure of the degree of strategic dependence. 
Strategic dependence is high when the product is greater than 1.  
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(B1 = [40, 100], H1 = [4, 40]) 
(B∞ = 89, H∞ = 36) 
Product of the slopes at equilibrium = 0.733 
(B1 = [28, 100], H1 = [16, 80]) 
(B∞ = 56, H∞ = 44) 
Product of the slopes at equilibrium = 0.886 
 (B1 = [85, 100], H1 = [20, 40]) 
 (B∞ = 63, H∞ = 26) 
      Product of the slopes at equilibrium = 0.224 
(B1 = [3, 100], H1 = [2, 80]) 
(B∞ = [4, 98], H∞ = [4, 76]) 
  Product of the slopes at equilibrium= 1.378 
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B0 = [50, 100] and H0 = [0, 40].  The flatness of the best response curves implies that 
the next iteration of rationalization eliminates even more strategies, with B1 = [85, 
100] and H1 = [20, 40]. One more iteration of the rationalization process eliminates 
some dominated strategies and limits the final rationalizable set of strategies to the RE 
equilibrium.    
Comparing across scenarios, Figure 2 shows that two iterations of rationalization 
leave larger sets of strategies remaining when the report places more weight on the 
manipulable information (comparing A to C and B to D), and when incentive 
uncertainty is greater (comparing A to B and C to D).  Additional iterations tell a 
slightly different story: with infinite iterations, the rationalization process eliminates 
all strategies other than the equilibrium outcome in Scenarios A, B and C, although the 
process is far slower in scenario C; however, additional iterations eliminate hardly any 
additional strategies in Scenario D, in which both the weight on the manager’s report 
and the reporting incentive uncertainty are high. In Scenario D, strategic dependence 
predicts that the RE equilibrium is likely to lose predictive power on subjects’ 
behaviors. 
Hypotheses 
 The preceding analyses suggest that it is harder for the manager and investors to 
form correct expectations of their opponent’s strategy when either higher weight on 
manipulable estimates or higher incentive uncertainty creates high strategic 
dependence.  I therefore predict that these aspects of the reporting environment lead 
players’ expectations to be less accurate, and lead players to deviate more from 
equilibrium.   
H1: Managers’ assessments of investors’ reliance and investors’ assessments 
of managers’ adjustments are less accurate when reports place more weight on 
managers’ value estimates, and when managers’ incentives are more uncertain. 
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H2: Managers’ manipulations and investors’ reliance deviate more from 
equilibrium when reports place more weight on managers’ value estimates, and 
when managers’ incentives are more uncertain.  
H2 focuses on absolute, rather than signed deviations, because there is no reason 
that time-averaged strategies must deviate from equilibrium over many rounds, just 
because no single round is close to equilibrium5.   Note also that the analyses on the 
measurements of strategic dependence seem to suggest that the effect of each variable 
is stronger when the other variable is at a high level. In particular, the rationalizable 
set of strategies is nonzero, and the product of the two best response curves is greater 
than 1, only when both weight and incentive uncertainty are high.  This result suggests 
that the weight placed on the manager’s estimate and the uncertainty in the manager’s 
reporting incentives may interact. However, because strategic dependence is used only 
as a heuristic to generate qualitative predictions about unknown equilibrating 
processes, I do not hypothesize an interaction. 
It is possible that inaccurate expectations and deviations from equilibrium arise not 
from players’ inability to settle into a stable pattern of behavior, but from their 
tendency to settle into a stable pattern in which expectations are incorrect and far from 
equilibrium.  To rule out this possibility, I examine instability in behavior over time.  
H3: Managers’ manipulations and investors’ reliance vary more over time and 
converge to equilibrium more slowly when reports place more weight on 
managers’ estimates, and when managers’ incentives are more uncertain. 
Note that the hypotheses above are not susceptible to the criticism (articulated by 
Kachelmeier (1996)) that they are foregone conclusions as long as the experiment 
successfully induces the correct payoffs and utility functions assumed by the 
                                                 
5
 Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) show that time average of players’ strategies converge to 
equilibrium under certain conditions.  
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equilibrium model.  Instead, the hypotheses are founded on an essentially 
psychological model of the process (rationalization) by which players choose their 
strategies.  The hypotheses would be rejected if players were somehow able to select 
equilibrium strategies even when many other strategies are rationalizable.  The 
hypotheses would also be rejected if characteristics of the players’ payoff functions 
might alter how they choose among strategies that survive rationalization. In 
particular, the analysis ignores the fact that high incentive uncertainty dramatically 
increases the possible losses that the manager could face by choosing a high 
adjustment factor, or that investors could face by choosing high reliance, even though 
these strategies survive rationalization. To the extent that players’ choices are 
determined by the risks involved in choosing strategies, rather than simply whether the 
strategies are ever best responses, the predictions of strategic dependence may not be 
upheld. Because there is no theory that predicts how players’ risk preferences might 
interact with the prediction of strategic dependence in determining their choices, I do 
not form hypotheses on the effect of risk preferences. 
 
III. THE EXPERIMENT 
Design 
To test the hypotheses laid out above, I conducted a laboratory experiment in a 2 
(high vs. low weight) x 2 (high vs. low incentive uncertainty) x 10 (repetition) x 2 
(order) mixed design as shown in Table 1.1. All variables except order were 
manipulated within-subjects. The design also includes two additional 10-round blocks 
for the high weight, high incentive uncertainty scenario to provide the subjects the best 
chance of learning in the high strategic dependence scenario. The parameter values in 
the experiment are identical to those used in generating Figure 1.2. Order of treatments 
was manipulated between-subjects to control for a potential order effect. A within-
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subjects design controls for variance due to differences across subjects and enhances 
the power of the experiment. A within-subjects design can also cause demand effects, 
but these demand effects are unlikely to change the accuracy of subjects’ expectations 
about other subjects’ choices (which is the focus of the experiment).  
 
TABLE 1.1 
The Experimental Design 
Treatment Block I Block II Block III Block IV Block V Block VI 
Order I LoW, LoU HiW, HiU LoW, HiU HiW, HiU HiW, HiU HiW, LoU 
Order II HiW, LoU HiW, HiU HiW, HiU LoW, HiU HiW, HiU LoW, LoU 
 
*Note: LoW, LoU = low weight and low incentive uncertainty (Scenario A); LoW, HiU= low 
weight and high incentive uncertainty (scenario B); HiW, LoU= High weight and low incentive 
uncertainty (scenario C); and HiW, HiU= High weight and high incentive uncertainty (scenario D).
 
40 students at a private university participated in the experiment. Half of the 
subjects were randomly assigned the role of manager throughout the session, and the 
other half were assigned the role of investor. Subjects’ identities were held anonymous 
throughout the session. To avoid the possibility that subjects’ behaviors would be 
affected by real-world knowledge associated with the roles of manager and investor, 
all the instructions and experimental materials were worded neutrally. The managers 
were called ‘reporters,’ and the investors were called ‘appraisers.’ For the ease of 
presentation, I refer to the players as managers and investors in the paper. (See 
Appendix II for instructions to participants.) 
Each manager was randomly paired with an investor at the beginning of the 
experiment and played with the same investor for the entire session. Fixed pairing is 
preferable to random pairing because it requires fewer subjects for the same statistical 
power, increases the opportunity for subjects to learn their opponents’ strategy, and 
better reflects the interaction between managers and investors in the real world.  A 
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potential cost of this choice is that fixed pairs may allow players to use multi-period 
strategies, and equilibria of the repeated game may differ from the equilibrium of the 
stage game if players can identify a cycle of outcomes that provide higher average 
payoffs for each player than their equilibrium payoffs in the stage game (Aumann, 
1976).  However, I test for and find no evidence of such behavior in the analysis. 
The Task  
In each round of play, each manager entered an expectation of the investor’s 
choice of reliance, and also chose a level of adjustment.  Their computer screens (see 
Appendix III for screen shots) showed the payoff they would expect to receive from 
their strategy given that their expectation was correct.  Managers were allowed to alter 
their expectations and strategy choices as often as they wished before confirming their 
choices.  Similarly, each investor entered an expectation of the manager’s choice of 
adjustment factor, and also chose a level of reliance. The possible choice for the level 
of reliance ranged from 0% to 100%, and for the level of adjustment from 0 to 5 
(where 5 is significantly higher than any reasonable level of adjustment predicted by 
the model).  
Actual payoffs in each round were determined by the average payoff received 
from 100 representative realizations of the various random variables in the model (the 
error in manager’s private information and manager’s incentive). The use of 100 
reports instead of one report per round has several benefits. It provides better measures 
of subjects’ actual strategies, rather than strategies associated with individual 
realizations of base value and incentive multiplier of a report. The payoffs calculated 
based on the average result of all 100 reports are more comparable across rounds, 
providing each player with more precise feedback about the other player’s strategy, 
therefore enhancing learning (Bloomfield,1994).   
In addition, I provided the subjects with graphs of the best response curves of their 
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own role in each scenario. Providing the best response curves reduces the noise in 
subjects’ strategies and is likely to increase the possibility for the subjects to reach the 
equilibrium. In each round, both players made their decisions simultaneously. After 
both players had made their choices, they moved on to the feedback screen where they 
reviewed their opponent’s actual strategy and their actual payoff calculated based on 
the actual strategies played. In addition, both the decision-making and feedback 
screens showed their decision history up to the last 5 rounds to facilitate their 
expectation formation.   
Administration  
Each session began with a short training session during which subjects learned 
about the experiment and became familiar with the task screen in four practice rounds. 
At the end of the session, subjects answered debriefing questions regarding their 
understanding of the experiment and their decision-making process. Subjects were told 
at the beginning of the experiment that their total laboratory winnings summed over all 
rounds excluding practice rounds would be used to determine their cash winnings in 
US dollars. They were also told that each subject’s performance would be compared to 
the average performance of the subjects in the same role in determining their cash 
winnings. This approach reduces the chance that a player believes that one’s payoff 
depends on the role that he/she plays. On average, each subject received $20 for the 80 
minute session in addition to a minimum show-up fee of $5.    
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This experimental design generates one block of 10 rounds for each of the four 
scenarios, along with an additional two blocks of 10 rounds each for the high strategic 
dependence scenario (High-Weight, High-Incentive Uncertainty). For hypothesis tests, 
I only use the first blocks of all scenarios in order to have a balanced statistical design. 
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In my exploratory analysis of dynamic behavior, I include all three blocks of the high 
strategic dependence scenario and examine its time series properties in detail.  
A total of 20 independent pairs played the four scenarios. To control for the 
dependence in subjects’ responses across rounds within each pair, dependent variables 
in the ANOVA analyses are generated by averaging relevant dependent variables over 
rounds within each treatment per pair. This provides in total 20 x 4 = 80 data points 
with 4 generated by each pair. All tests of hypotheses use a repeated-measures 
analysis to account for the fact that each cohort provides four (non-independent) 
observations.  
Hypothesis Tests 
H1 predicts that greater weight on the manager’s estimate and greater incentive 
uncertainty reduces the accuracy of participants’ expectations.  I use two types of 
measurements to test this hypothesis: the absolute errors in subjects’ expectations and 
the costs to them due to their expectation errors. I first calculate the second measure as 
the absolute difference between each subject’s actual payoff and the best payoff they 
could have obtained had they been able to predict their opponent’s strategy perfectly.  
This measure captures the true loss function of the players (rather than using the linear 
loss function assumed by the first measure), and also reveals the welfare consequences 
of expectation errors. I then calculate the absolute difference between the subject’s 
opponent’s choice and the subject’s expectation of that choice implied by their own 
choice (the choice to which their own is a best response). 
Figure 1.3 displays the results based on round 3 to round 10. Subjects’ responses 
in round 1 and round 2 are deleted to avoid noise due to inexperience with the game. 
Including the first two rounds in each scenario does not change the conclusion. Panel 
A of Figure 3 shows the charts of the average payoff losses due to expectation errors 
and the average absolute errors in subjects' expectations of their opponents' strategies 
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FIGURE 1.3 
 
Expectation Errors and Welfare Effects 
 
Panel A presents the average payoff losses due to the errors in expectations and the 
average absolute errors in subjects' expectations of their opponents' strategies over 
round 3 to round 10 for each scenario. Panel B presents the main effects of weight and 
incentive uncertainty and their interaction on the payoff losses and expectation errors. 
PayLossInv (PayLossMA) is defined as the difference between investors/managers' 
actual payoffs and the optimal payoffs they would have obtained if their expectations 
were perfectly accurate. By construction, PayLossInv (PayLossMA) is always non-
positive. ExpRel(ExpAdj) is defined as managers (investors)' expectation of their 
opponent's reliance (adjustment), calculated from the optimal response to their own 
strategies. The significance levels for the main and interaction effects are computed 
using repeated-measures ANOVA analysis.  All associated p-values are two-tailed. 
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Panel A: Average payoff losses due to expectation errors and average absolute expectation errors. 
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FIGURE 1.3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Statistics of the main and interaction effects 
Variable Effect F-statistics p-value 
PayLossInv Weight 15.72 0.00 
 Incentive Uncertainty 7.75 0.02 
 Weight x IU 5.97 0.03 
PayLossMA Weight 6.09 0.03 
 Incentive Uncertainty 5.34 0.04 
 Weight x IU 5.85 0.03 
|ExpAdj-Adjustment| Weight 6.13 0.03 
 Incentive Uncertainty 7.64 0.02 
 Weight x IU 0.67 0.43 
|ExpRel-Reliance| Weight 0.57 0.47 
 Incentive Uncertainty 0.02 0.90 
  Weight x IU 0.91 0.36 
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across the conditions of incentive uncertainty and weight. Panel B of Figure 1.3 
presents the main and interaction effects of weight and incentive uncertainty on payoff 
losses and expectation errors.  
Consistent with H1, the welfare consequences of expectation errors are all 
statistically significant and in the predicted direction. For the investors, increasing in 
weight reduces investors’ average payoff relative to their best payoffs possible by 
28.01 (p-value < 0.01) and increasing in incentive uncertainty decreases the investors’ 
average payoff relative to their best payoffs possible by 15.78 (p-value = 0.02)6. For 
the managers, increasing in weight reduces the managers’ average payoff by 13.15 (p-
value = 0.03) and increasing in incentive uncertainty decreases their average payoff by 
16.88 (p-value = 0.04). The interaction between weight and incentive uncertainty is 
highly significant for both the managers and investors (p-values = 0.03 for both the 
managers and investors). The simple means of subjects’ payoff losses further reveal 
that the interaction effect is driven by the much higher payoff losses in the high 
strategic dependence scenario. In contrast, payoff losses are relatively small when 
either weight or incentive uncertainty is low.  These results strongly support H1.  
Measuring absolute errors in expectations (rather than the payoff effect of those 
errors) reveals a slightly different story. Neither the effect of weight nor the effect of 
incentive uncertainty significantly influences managers’ absolute expectation errors 
(p-value = 0.47 and p-value = 0.90 respectively). Weight significantly reduces 
investors’ absolute expectation errors (p-value = 0.03), but incentive uncertainty 
actually decreases investors’ expectation errors (p-value = 0.02).  
As discussed in Section II, the weak effect of incentive uncertainty on expectation 
errors may arise because players do not choose arbitrarily from within the set of 
                                                 
6
 All p-values presented in the paper are two-sided, unless otherwise indicated. 
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feasible strategies remaining after iterated deletion of dominated strategies. I test this 
explanation after presenting evidence for hypotheses H2 and H3.  
H2 states that strategic dependence reduces the predictive power of the rational 
expectations equilibrium. Similar to the analysis for H1, I compute two types of 
measures to test this hypothesis: the absolute deviations of their payoffs from the 
equilibrium payoffs and the absolute deviations of subjects’ strategies from the 
equilibrium values. Both measures are averaged over the last 8 rounds in each 
scenario.  
The results are reported in Figure 1.4. Consistent with H2, subjects’ payoffs 
deviate more from the equilibrium payoffs when strategic dependence is higher. An 
increase in weight significantly increases the deviation of the investors’ payoff 
(managers’ payoff) from the equilibrium payoff with a p-value of 0.01 (p-value < 
0.01), and an increase in incentive uncertainty significantly increases the deviation of 
the investors’ payoff (managers’ payoff) with a p-value of 0.01 (p-value < 0.01). The 
interaction between weight and incentive uncertainty is significant for the managers 
(p-value = 0.01) and marginally significant for the investors (p-value = 0.07, one-
sided). Overall, the evidence is consistent with H2, which predicts that strategic 
dependence reduces the predictive power of the REE.  
Figure 1.4 also shows the results on the absolute deviations of subjects’ strategies 
from equilibrium behavior. An increase in weight increases both the absolute 
deviations of the investors’ reliance and the managers’ adjustment from equilibrium 
(p-value < 0.01 and p-value = 0.01 respectively). However, similar to the findings on 
the absolute expectation errors in Figure 3, the effect of incentive uncertainty is 
insignificant for either the absolute deviation of the investors’ reliance (p-value = 
0.15) or the absolute deviations of the managers’ adjustment (p-value = 0.37).  
H3 predicts that subjects’ strategies fluctuate more when strategic dependence is 
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FIGURE 1.4 
 
Predictive Power of Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
 
Panel A displays the average deviations of subjects' payoffs from the equilibrium 
payoffs and the average absolute deviations of Reliance and Adjustment from the 
rational expectations equilibrium over the last eight rounds in each of the four 
scenarios. Panel B displays the main and interaction effects of weight and incentive 
uncertainty for each of the four variables. The variable Payoff* represent the 
equilibrium payoff. The variables Reliance* and Adjustment* denote the equilibrium 
reliance and adjustment. Significance levels for all interactions and main effects are 
computed using repeated-measures ANOVA analysis. All associated p-values are two-
tailed. 
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Panel A: Average absolute deviations of payoffs and strategies from equilibrium 
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FIGURE 1.4 (Continued) 
Panel B: Statistics for the main and interaction effects 
 
Variable Effect F-statistics p-value 
|Payoff - Payoff*| (Investor) Weight 10.27 0.01 
 Incentive Uncertainty 5.92 0.01 
 Weight x IU 2.60 0.14 
|Payoff - Payoff*| (Manager) Weight 16.10 0.00 
 Incentive Uncertainty 19.03 0.00 
 Weight x IU 11.66 0.01 
|Reliance - Reliance*| Weight 58.79 <.0001 
 Incentive Uncertainty 2.40 0.15 
 Weight x IU 2.37 0.15 
|Adjustment - Adjustment*| Weight 9.11 0.01 
 Incentive Uncertainty 0.87 0.37 
  Weight x IU 0.13 0.73 
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higher. Support for H3 rules out the possibility that inaccurate expectations and 
deviations from equilibrium arise because players settle on a consistent disequilibrium 
outcome. The effects of strategic dependence on the standard deviations of reliance 
and adjustment are shown in Figure 1.5. Panel A presents the charts of the cell means 
of the standard deviations. Panel B summarizes the main and interaction effects of 
weight and incentive uncertainty. The effects of weight on the standard deviations of 
both reliance and adjustment support H3. An increase in weight significantly increases 
the standard deviation of investors’ reliance and the standard deviation of managers’ 
adjustment. However, the effect of incentive uncertainty is only significant on the 
variation of investors’ reliance in the predicted direction, but is significant in the 
opposite direction to the hypothesis on the variation of managers’ adjustment.  
To check whether high variations are indeed driven by strategies varying round by 
round, I calculate the absolute changes in investors’ reliance and managers’ 
adjustment in consecutive rounds over round 3 to round 10. Results are displayed in 
panel B of Figure 1.5. The behaviors of the absolute changes in reliance and 
adjustment confirm that the higher standard deviations in subjects’ strategies are 
mostly driven by fluctuation in their strategies. High weight is associated with greater 
absolute changes in both reliance and adjustment. And high incentive uncertainty 
induces greater absolute change in reliance. Consistent with the explanation of payoff 
sensitivity, high incentive uncertainty is associated with lower absolute change in 
adjustment.7  
                                                 
7
 To ensure that absolute deviations from equilibrium are not due to subjects consistently playing 
strategies lower or higher than the equilibrium, I also analyze time-averaged strategy choices. If the 
deviations are driven by differences in subjects’ ability to develop accurate expectations, time-averaged 
behaviors should be closer to the equilibrium predictions. Specifically, I compare subjects’ time-
averaged payoffs and time-averaged strategies over the last 8 rounds in each scenario to the equilibrium 
strategies and payoffs. Except for the reliance in the high incentive uncertainty scenarios, the average 
strategies over the last 8 rounds are statistically indistinguishable from the equilibrium strategies.  Even 
in the high incentive uncertainty scenarios, the average deviation from equilibrium accounts for only a 
small portion of investors’ payoff losses relative to equilibrium. 
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FIGURE 1.5 
 
Time-Averaged Behavior 
 
Panel A displays the average deviations of subjects' payoffs from the equilibrium 
payoffs and the average deviations of Reliance and Adjustment from the rational 
expectations equilibrium over the last eight rounds in each of the four scenarios. Panel 
B displays the main and interaction effects of weight and incentive uncertainty for 
each of the four variables. The variable Payoff* represent the equilibrium payoff. The 
variables Reliance* and Adjustment* denote the equilibrium reliance and adjustment. 
Significance levels for all interactions and main effects are computed using repeated-
measures ANOVA analysis. All associated p-values are two-tailed.
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Panel A: Average deviations of payoffs and strategies from equilibrium 
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FIGURE 1.5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Statistics of the main and interaction effects of weight and incentive uncertainty 
 
Variable Effect 
F-
statistics p-value 
Payoff - Payoff* (Investor) Weight 7.67 0.02 
 Incentive Uncertainty 4.45 0.06 
 Weight x IU 7.05 0.02 
Payoff - Payoff* (Manager) Weight 0.28 0.61 
 Incentive Uncertainty 0.60 0.45 
 Weight x IU 0.13 0.73 
Reliance - Reliance* Weight 0.09 0.77 
 Incentive Uncertainty 6.42 0.03 
 Weight x IU 0.67 0.43 
Adjustment -Adjustment* Weight 0.38 0.55 
 Incentive Uncertainty 1.19 0.30 
  Weight x IU 5.74 0.04 
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Overall, the evidence supports H3 that subjects adapt to past strategies and change 
their strategies over time, and more so when strategic dependence is higher and payoff 
sensitivity is lower. High variations in strategies make it harder for subjects to 
converge to equilibrium due to noisier performance feedback. The following section 
investigates these anomalous results in more details. 
 Analysis of Anomalous Results 
My hypotheses assumed that players chose strategies arbitrarily among those that 
survive at least two iterations of rationalization. In this analysis, I examine whether the 
weak effect of incentive uncertainty on expectation errors arises because players avoid 
strategies with high payoff risk, even though they may be consistent with several 
iterations of rationalization.  
To test this conjecture, I calculate the average sensitivity of the players’ payoffs to 
their opponents’ strategies for each level of their own strategy, and also calculate the 
range of strategies consistent with second-order rationalization (B2 and H2).8  The 
average sensitivity of both players’ payoffs for all four scenarios is depicted as solid 
lines in Figure 1.6, superimposed over a histogram indicating the average frequencies 
of players’ strategies for each level, shown as light grey bars. 
The graphs show that strategies inconsistent with second-order rationalization are 
rarely selected. Within the remaining strategies, those with very high payoff sensitivity 
are also rarely selected, particularly in the scenarios with high payoff uncertainty. To 
formally establish this tendency, I conduct a regression analysis on the frequency of 
strategies. The independent variables include a binary variable with a value of 1 if the 
strategy satisfies second-order rationalization and a value of 0 otherwise (The analysis 
based on zero-order or first-order rationalization gives similar 
                                                 
8
 The players’ payoffs are monotonic in their opponent’s strategy for each level of their own 
strategy. Specifically, investors’ payoff decreases monotonically in the manager’s manipulation and the 
manager’s payoff increases monotonically in investors’ reliance, ceteris paribus.  
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FIGURE 1.6 
 
 Average Frequency of Strategies and Payoff Sensitivity 
 
This figure shows the average frequency of players’ strategies and players’ 
average payoff sensitivity to their opponents’ strategies. Panel A to Panel D show for 
all 4 scenarios the average frequency of investors’ reliance, depicted as grey vertical 
bars, and the investors’ average payoff sensitivity to the manager’s manipulation, 
depicted as black dotted lines. Panel E to Panel H show the average frequency of the 
manager’s manipulation and average payoff sensitivity to investors’ reliance. The 
frequency of strategies is displayed on the left vertical axis and the payoff sensitivity 
is displayed on the right vertical axis. The two dashed lines indicate the range of 
strategies that survive the second-order rationalization.   
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Panel A: Low Weight, Low Incentive Uncertainty             Panel B: Low Weight, High Incentive Uncertainty 
Reliance       Reliance 
 
Panel C: High Weight, Low Incentive Uncertainty  Panel D: High Weight, High Incentive Uncertainty 
      
Reliance        Reliance 
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FIGURE 1.6 (continued) 
Panel E: Low Weight, Low Incentive Uncertainty   Panel F: Low Weight, High Incentive Uncertainty 
Adjustment       Adjustment 
 
Panel G: Low Weight, Low Incentive Uncertainty   Panel H: Low Weight, High Incentive Uncertainty 
Adjustment       Adjustment 
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results), payoff sensitivity, and an interaction between payoff sensitivity and the 
binary variable. Results shown in Table 1.2 provide evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis. Players are more likely to choose strategies that satisfy second-order 
rationalization (both p-values < 0.01), and among those strategies, are less likely to 
choose strategies that result in highly variable payoffs (p-value < 0.01 and p-value = 
0.05 for the frequencies of reliance and adjustment respectively).   
 
TABLE 1.2 
Influence of Rationalizability and Payoff Sensitivity on Strategy Choice 
 
This table presents the regression analysis of the frequency of strategies. The 
independent variables include a binary variable (Dummy) with a value of 1 if the 
strategy satisfies second-order rationalization and a value of 0 otherwise, payoff 
sensitivity (Pay Sensitivity), and an interaction between the binary variable and payoff 
sensitivity. Payoff sensitivity is calculated as the average sensitivity of players' payoffs 
to their opponents' strategies for each level of their own strategy. 
 
The regression model: Frequency = α + β1*Dummy + β2*Pay Sensitivity + 
β3*(Pay Sensitivity*Dummy) 
Dependent Variable α β1 β2 β3 Adjusted R2 
Frequency of Reliance 0.653 2.296 0.005 -0.011 0.127 
P-value 0.001 <0.0001 0.101 0.003  
Frequency of 
Adjustment 1.136 2.785 -0.006 -0.014 0.086 
P-value 0.001 <0.0001 0.060 0.049   
 
The result indicates that an increase in incentive uncertainty also increases players’ 
payoff sensitivity to their opponents’ strategies, which motivates players to respond 
strongly to their incentives and to avoid risky strategies. Therefore, increasing 
management incentive uncertainty dampens the effect of strategic dependence by 
increasing players’ payoff sensitivity.   
Supplementary Analysis  
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While the theory of rationalization assumes that players base their strategy choices 
on an analysis of best response functions, the predictions of rationalization are very 
similar to the long-run predictions that would be derived from analysis of “adaptive” 
processes that assume that players alter their strategies in response to prior experience 
in the game (see Moulin 1984; Samuelson and Zhang 1992). Adaptive processes also 
predict learning behavior in the short run.  I now conduct exploratory analyses of 
short-term learning behavior, which may shed light on how the actual reliability of 
financial reports (as determined by managers’ adjustment factors) and their perceived 
reliability (as determined by investors’ reliance) may vary over time. 
To examine the speed of convergence, I estimate the following regression model 
for both expectation errors and absolute deviations from equilibrium: 
1 2( )DV SDdummy Round Round SDdummyα β β= + + + × , 
where DV denotes appropriate dependent variable, Round is the number of rounds 
elapsed in the scenario, and SDdummy is an indicator that takes a value of 1 for the 
low strategic dependence scenario (Low-Weight, Low-Incentive Uncertainty) and 0 
for the high strategic dependence scenario (High-Weight, High-Incentive 
Uncertainty). A significant negative coefficient on the third term in the regression 
model, 2β , would suggest a faster convergence in the low strategic dependence 
scenario. As Table 1.3 shows, the results on the absolute deviations from equilibrium 
and investors’ expectation errors are all consistent with this hypothesis.9 The 
coefficient 2β  is negative and statistically significant in all four models. The evidence 
strongly supports the strategic dependence argument that subjects learn faster and 
converge to equilibrium at a higher speed when strategic dependence is lower. 
 
                                                 
9
 The results are similar when only the first block of scenario D is included in the regressions. 
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TABLE 1.3 
Time Series Properties of Strategies 
 
This table presents the results of the regression models that compare the speed of 
convergence of the four variables between the low and high strategic dependence 
scenarios (scenarios A and D). Round is the number of rounds elapsed in the scenario. 
SDdummy is an indicator that takes a value of 1 for the low strategic dependence 
scenario. All three blocks of the high strategic dependence scenario are included in the 
regression analysis. 
The regression model: DV = α+SDdummy+β1*Round+β2*(Round*SDdummy)  
Dependent Variable α SDdummy β1 p-value β2 p-value Adjusted R2 
|ExpRel-Reliance| 24.243 11.627 -0.307 0.001 -2.663 <0.000 0.053 
|ExpAdj-Adjustment| 19.846 8.356 -0.354 <0.0001 -1.321 0.001 0.058 
|Reliance - 
Reliance*| 16.337 -5.024 -0.118 0.046 -0.588 0.062 0.063 
|Adjustment - 
Adjustment*| 15.629 -0.276 -0.300 <0.000 -0.888 0.001 0.069 
 
To examine how actual and perceived reliability change over time, I estimate the 
following regression models for investors and managers in each of the four scenarios: 
For investors: 
For managers:  
where Adj, Reliance, ExpAdj and ExpRel are defined as in Figure 3.  The regression 
results are presented in Table 4. The adjusted R2s range from 0.39 to 0.57 explaining 
about half of subjects’ changes in strategies. For Investors (managers), 1β is positive 
(negative) and statistically significant for all scenarios. A positive (negative) 1β for 
investors (managers) suggests that when managers’ adjustment (investors’ reliance) in 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1
3 1 2 4 1 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t t t t t t
t t t t
Reliance Reliance ExpAdj Adj ExpRel Reliance
Reliance Reliance Adj Adj
α β β
β β
− − − − −
− − − −
− = + − + −
+ − + −
1 1 1 1 2 1 1
3 1 2 4 1 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t t t t t t
t t t t
Adj Adj ExpRel Reliance ExpAdj Adj
Adj Adj Reliance Reliance
α β β
β β
− − − − −
− − − −
− = + − + −
+ − + −
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the previous round was lower than expected investors (managers) are likely to increase 
(reduce) their reliance (adjustment) in current round. This is consistent with players 
moving toward their best responses in the previous round. 2β  in the investor 
regression model is positive and statistically significant in all four scenarios, 
suggesting that when managers’ adjustment in the previous round was higher than 
optimal investors increase their reliance in current round. Similarly, 2β in the manager 
regression model is significantly positive in scenarios C and D, suggesting that when 
investors’ reliance in the previous round was lower than optimal, managers increase 
their adjustment in current round. The evidence shows that subjects anticipate their 
opponents’ actions and act accordingly. Both 3β  and 4β  are either insignificant or 
significantly negative. This suggests subjects tend to reverse the changes in their 
strategies in the previous round and react to changes in their opponents’ strategies.  
These analyses suggest that perceived and actual reliability are likely to change in 
predictable ways over time, particularly when strategic dependence is high.  It would 
therefore be an oversimplification to assume accounting manipulation and investors’ 
reliance are at the equilibrium levels, especially when managers have great discretion 
on financial reports and face greater uncertainty in reporting incentives.  
 
V.CONCLUSION 
This paper modifies Dye and Sridhar’s [2004] framework for examining the 
optimal trade-off between relevance and reliability when the manager can provide 
relevant but potentially manipulable (and therefore unreliable) information to 
accounting reports.  An equilibrium analysis shows that the optimal incorporation of 
the manager’s claims decreases as investors become more uncertain about the 
manager’s reporting incentives.  A disequilibrium analysis further shows that 
equilibria are less likely to be attained—to the detriment of investors—when the 
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accounting report places greater weight on the manager’s claims and when investors 
are less certain about the manager’s incentives. A laboratory experiment largely 
confirms this prediction, and shows that such characteristics of the reporting 
environment significantly reduce investor welfare.  
The results have implications for regulators, given the current movement toward 
extending the use of fair value measurements in financial reports. Fair value 
measurements are often considered to be more relevant but less reliable due to 
measurement errors and manipulation. My results show that failing to consider the 
uncertainty in management reporting incentives may result in overstating the degree to 
which fair value or other manipulable estimates should be incorporated into 
accounting reports. Moreover, incorporating more fair value measurements may have 
an unintended consequence in making the actual reliability of financial reports more 
variable and less predictable for investors by increasing the strategic dependence 
between the manager and investors. The welfare analysis indicates that investors’ 
interest is likely to be harmed when management reporting incentives are uncertain. 
 Supplementary analyses suggest that the market-perceived reliability of financial 
reports does not always equal the actual reliability, and that both may vary over time. 
Therefore, value-relevance studies that assume an efficient market are likely to 
misestimate the actual relevance and reliability of the accounting information under 
examination. Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2002) recognize this issue and propose to 
incorporate information in delayed future market reactions in estimating value-
relevance coefficient.  
To the extent that management investment decisions are based on expected market 
reactions, unpredictable market use of financial reports is likely to cause inefficient 
investment decisions. This concern is shared by Liang and Wen (2005) and Plantin, 
Sapra, and Shin (2005). Liang and Wen show analytically that an increase in 
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accounting noise and manipulation induces greater market mispricing, and 
consequently, causes a less efficient investment decision. Plantin et al. argue that 
shifting toward fair value accounting may cause excessive artificial volatility that 
degrades the informational value of market prices and induces less efficient 
investment decisions.  
Certain characteristics of the experiment may limit the generalizability of the 
results to real markets. In the experiment, I use a two-player game to test the effect of 
strategic dependence on the predictive power of equilibrium. Analyses on time-
averaged strategies (untabulated) show that the rational expectations equilibrium has 
fairly good predictive power on players’ time-averaged behaviors. If investors’ beliefs 
are uncorrelated, the law of large numbers may allow investor reliance to reach a 
steady state. In addition, other market and institutional factors not captured in the 
current experimental setting, such as the existence of arbitrageurs and auditing 
services, are also likely to have an impact on the manager-investors interaction. 
Alternatively, the addition of more players (and therefore more strategic uncertainty) 
may make equilibrium even more difficult to achieve.  
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APPENDI X 
I: Proofs 
A. Proof of Theorem 1 
Proof: Given the valuation model, ( )e r a brω = +  and realizations ( , ,m ωω ε ) of 
( , ,m ωω ε% %% ), the manager chooses mω  to maximize 
2( ) ( )
2 m f
c
m a br ω ω+ − −  
The first order condition with respect to mω  implies: ( , )m
mb
c
ω ω
λ
ω ω ε ω ε= + +  
Since hω ω δ= + , we can write the aggregated report r as:  
( , ) (1 )
( ) (1 )
m hr
mb
c
ω
ω
λω ω ε λ ω
λ
ω λ ε λ δ
= + −
= + + + −
 
Therefore, applying a method of standard linear regression, we have: 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2[ | ] ( [ ])var( ) (1 )E r r E vv
ω
ω ε δ
σ
ω ω ω λ
σ λ λ σ λ σ= + − −+ + + −
%
 
where v is the amount of manipulation in the manager’s report. In the equilibrium, 
v has the following properties: [ ] [ ]b bE v E m m
c c
λ λ
= =  and 2 2var( ) ( ) m
b
v
c
λ
σ=  
From this, it is clear that the expression for b in the valuation model is 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 )m
b b
c
ω
ω ε δ
σ
λ
σ λ σ λ σ λ σ
=
+ + + −
  (A1) 
The constant a has the following form in equilibrium: (1 ) b ma b b
c
λ
ω λ= − −  
When ω  and m  are zero, it is clear that equilibrium a  is zero. 
 46 
B. Derivation of the optimal λ that maximizes b  
Define the optimal λ , denoted *λ , as the aggregator that maximizes the 
information value of the aggregated report, i.e. b . We can rewrite equation A1 as: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 ) 0m
bb b b b
c
ω ε δ ω
λ
σ λ σ λ σ λ σ σ+ + + − − =   (B1) 
Solving for *λ  using implicit differentiation, we get: 
2 4 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 23 4 2 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 0m m
b b b b b bb b
c c
ω ε ε δ δ
λ λ
σ σ σ λ σ λσ λ σ λ σλ λ λ λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + + + + − − − =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
2 4 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
3 3
2 2 2 2
2
2 4
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
( 3 (1 ) ) 2 4 2 ( ) 0
2 4 2 ( )
3 (1 )
m m
m
m
b b bb b
c c
bb bb c
b
c
ω ε δ δ ε δ
δ ε δ
ω ε δ
λ λ
σ σ λ σ λ σ σ σ λ σ σλ
λ
σ σ λ σ σ
λλ
σ σ λ σ λ σ
∂
+ + + − − + + + =
∂
− − +∂
=
∂
+ + + −
 
Since the denominator is always greater than zero, setting bλ
∂
∂
 to zero implies the 
numerator must be zero: 
2 3
2 2 2 2
22 ( ) 0m
b
c
δ ε δ
λ
σ σ λ σ σ− − + =    (B2) 
We also know that *λ  and the maximum b  satisfy equation B1. Therefore, *λ  
and the maximum b  can be determined by equations B1 and B2.  
Due to the complexity of the terms involved, *λ and the maximum  b cannot be 
solved explicitly. However, we can define 'λ  as the optimal λ  when 2mσ  is zero, 
which corresponds to the case in Dye and Sridhar [2004]. When 2mσ  is zero, the 
optimal λ  can be determined from the following equation: 
2 2 2( ) 0δ ε δσ λ σ σ− + =    (B3) 
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Given 2δσ  and 
2
εσ , equations B2 and B3 imply that: 
2 3
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 3
2 2 2
2
*
'( ) 2 *( ) 0
*( ' *)( ) 2 0
m
m
b
c
b
c
ε δ ε δ
ε δ
λλ σ σ σ λ σ σ
λλ λ σ σ σ
+ − − + =
− + − =
 
Since 
2 3
2
2
*2 m
b
c
λ
σ > 0, it follows that 'λ  has to be greater than *λ . 
More formally, we can show that  
*
2
m
λ
σ
∂
∂
 is negative. Applying implicit 
differentiation on equation B2, we get: 
2 3 2 2 3
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 3 2 3
2 2
2 2 3 2 22
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 6 4 ( ) 0
2 2
6 4 ( ) 6 ( )
m m
m m m
m
m m m
b b b b
c c c
b b
c c
b b b b
c c c
ε δ
ε δ ε δ
λ λ λ λ λ λ
σ σ σ σ
σ λ σ σ
λ λ
λ
λ λ λσ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σλ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + + + =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− −∂
= =
∂∂
+ + + + +
∂
 
The last equality follows because bλ
∂
∂
 is zero when λ  is chosen to maximize b . It 
is clear that 2
m
λ
σ
∂
∂
 is negative, therefore, the optimal λ  decreases in 2mσ . 
This result indicates that the optimal λ  when incentive uncertainty is present is 
lower than the optimal λ  documented in Dye and Sridhar [2004]. Ignoring the 
uncertainty in management reporting incentives may cause λ  to be set higher than 
equilibrium and reduce the informational value of accounting reports.  
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C: Proof of increasing local measure of strategic dependence with incentive 
uncertainty   
Recall that the best response functions for the manager and investors are: 
* ( ) bb
c
λθ =  
2
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 ) m
b ω
ω ε δ
σθ
σ λ σ λ σ λ σ θ= + + − +  
The slopes of the best response functions at the equilibrium can be obtained by 
taking derivative with respect to the argument of each equation, and then evaluating 
the derivatives at the equilibrium values.  
*
,RE REbb cθ
θ λ∂
=
∂
 
, , ,
2 2 2 3 3 2*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
( (1 ) )b b bRE RE RE RE RE RE
m m
m
bb
cθ θ θ
ω
ω ε δ ω
θλ σ σ λ σ
θ σ λ σ λ σ λ σ θ σ
− −∂
= =
∂ + + − +
 
To show that the local measure of the degree of strategic dependence is increasing 
in 2mσ , it is equivalent to show 
, ,
* *
| |
b bRE RE RE RE
b
b θ θ
θ
θ
∂ ∂
×
∂ ∂
 is increasing in 2mσ . Since 
*
,RE REbb θ
θ∂
∂
 is independent of 2mσ , we only need to consider 
*
,RE REb
b
θθ
∂
∂
, or simply 
*3 2
mb σ , as a function of 
2
mσ .  
*3 2 *
*2 2 *3
2 2
( ) 3m m
m m
b bb bσ σ
σ σ
∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂
 
*
2
m
b
σ
∂
∂
 can be derived by using implicit differentiation on equation B1 with respect 
to 2mσ  as follows: 
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* *2 4 * *3 4 * *
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
*3 4
* 2
*2 42
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Since *b  is at the equilibrium value, using equation B1 to simplify the expression, 
we get: 
*4 4
* 2
*3 42
2 2
22m m
b
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b
c
ω
λ
λσ
σ σ
−∂
=
∂
+
 
Plug it into 
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m
b σ
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∂
∂
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Therefore, to show 
*3 2
2
( )m
m
b σ
σ
∂
∂
 is positive, we only need to show the numerator is 
greater than zero, i.e. 2ωσ  is greater than
*3 4
2
2 m
b
c
λ
σ . This follows easily from equation 
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B1. Since 
*3 4
2 * 2 * 2 2 * 2 2 2
2 (1 )m
b b b b
c
ω ε δ ω
λ
σ σ λ σ λ σ σ+ + + − =  and 
* 2 * 2 2 * 2 2(1 )b b bω ε δσ λ σ λ σ+ + −  is strictly greater than zero, it follows that  2ωσ  is greater 
than 
*3 4
2
2 m
b
c
λ
σ . 
D: Proof of increasing strategic dependence with weight  
To show that the product of the two best response functions at equilibrium is 
increasing in λ , it is equivalent to show 
, ,
* *
| |
b bRE RE RE RE
b
b θ θ
θ
θ
∂ ∂
×
∂ ∂
 is increasing in λ . 
From Appendix I.C., we know 
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The local measure of strategic dependence would be increasing in λ  if 
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2 2 2 2 22 (2 )ω δ εσ λ λ σ λ σ+ − − −  is positive. Since 22 λ λ− −  is always positive, a 
sufficient condition is 
2
2 2 2 22 0,  which implies a sufficient condition is 
2
ε
ω ε ω
σ
σ λ σ σ− > > . This condition can 
also be expressed as 
2
22
ε
ω
σ
σ
> . The ratio 
2
2
ε
ω
σ
σ
 indicates the relative noisiness of the 
manager’s signal. The more noise the manipulable signal contains and the less 
variability the value of net assets has, the higher the ratio. The result indicates that the 
degree of strategic dependence increases with the relative informativeness of the 
manager’s signal. Intuitively, the more informative the manager’s signal, the higher 
the investors should rely on the aggregated report in equilibrium. Therefore, an 
increase in the weight on the manager’s report increases the sensitivity of investors’ 
reliance to the manager’s manipulation. 
 
E. Analysis on investors’ equilibrium welfare in relation to weight and incentive 
uncertainty 
I first show how investors’ equilibrium welfare changes with weight. 
The investors’ welfare at the equilibrium is: 
2
2
2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
[ ] [ ( ) ]
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c
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ω
λ
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λ
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Take derivative with respect to λ :  
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 holds in equilibrium, the above 
equation can be written as: 
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The last equality comes from the equilibrium b being 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 )m
b
c
ω
ω ε δ
σ
λ
σ λ σ λ σ λ σ+ + + −
. Since [ ]invE Vλ
∂
∂
 has the same sign as bλ
∂
∂
, when 
λ  is chosen to maximize b, i.e. 0bλ
∂
=
∂
, investors’ welfare is also maximized.  
Now I show investors’ equilibrium welfare decreases in incentive uncertainty. 
Take derivative with respect to 2mσ : 
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Since 
4 4
2
2
b
c
ω
λ
σ−  is always negative, it shows investors’ welfare decreases with the 
uncertainty in management reporting incentives. 
 
F. Proof of the optimality of a linear valuation model 
From Appendix I.A., we know ( ) (1 )mbr
c
ω
λ
ω λ ε λ δ= + + + − . ω , m , ωε , and δ  
are independently and normally distributed. Therefore, (r, ω ) are bivariate normal. 
Specifically, 
(r, ω ) ~ bivariate normal ( 2 2, , , ,
r r rω ω ωµ µ σ σ ρ ), where 
2
,
r
mb
c
λµ ω= + ,ωµ ω=  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 ) ,
r m
b
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ω ε δ
λ
σ σ λ σ λ σ λ σ= + + + −  2 2ω ωσ σ= , and 
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Given the normality assumption, the best predictor of ω  given investors’ quadratic 
loss function is simply E[ω |r]. 
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This proves that the best valuation function is linear in r. Moreover, when ω  and 
m  are zero, E[ω |r] is simplified to 
2
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rb
c
ω
ω ε δ
σ
λ
σ λ σ λ σ λ σ+ + + −
. 
The variance of the best predictor is 
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II: Instructions 
Introduction 
This experiment is about economic decision making. You will be paired with 
another subject to play a two-person game for 10 rounds per scenario in many 
different scenarios. Some scenarios may be played multiple times, while some other 
scenarios will only be played once or not at all. You will always know which scenario 
you are in. There are 64 rounds in total including 4 practice rounds. At the end of the 
session, we will ask you a series of questions about your experience. The total session 
lasts about 80 minutes. You will gain ‘laboratory dollars’ in this experiment. Your 
gains in laboratory dollars will be converted to US dollars after you complete the 
experiment. 
Overview 
There are two types of players: reporter and appraiser.  Half of the subjects will be 
randomly picked to play the role of reporter and the other half will play the role of 
appraiser for the entire session. A reporter will be randomly paired with an appraiser at 
the beginning of the session and will play with the same appraiser throughout the 
session. Players’ identities are kept anonymous throughout the experiment.  
The reporter learns a base value, and reports a number to the appraiser. The 
appraiser estimates the base value based on the reported number. The appraiser always 
earns more by estimating the base value more accurately.  The reporter sometimes 
earns more by getting the appraiser to overestimate the base value, and sometimes 
earns more by getting the appraiser to underestimate the base value, depending on a 
random number called an incentive multiplier.   
Reporter’s Task 
The base value is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation 10. 
The incentive multiplier indicates how his/her payoff will be linked to the appraiser’s 
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estimate of the base value. The standard deviation of the multiplier will be different in 
different scenarios. A higher standard deviation means the realized incentive 
multiplier is more likely to be farther away from zero. 
The reporter’s task is to choose an adjustment factor which will be multiplied 
with the incentive multiplier to determine the reporter’s total adjustment for each 
report. The percentage of the adjustment that is added to base value will be different in 
different scenarios. A higher weight on the total adjustment means the reported value 
is influenced more by the reporter’s adjustment. 
In summary, the report is determined by the equation: 
Reported Value = Base Value + Weight x (Incentive Multiplier x Adjustment 
Factor) 
• If the reporter chooses an adjustment factor of 0, the reported value is always 
equal to the base value.    
• Greater adjustment factors make the report lower than the base value if the 
incentive multiplier is negative. Greater adjustment factors make the report 
higher than the base value if the incentive multiplier is positive. 
• The greater the adjustment factor, the more the report is increased (for positive 
incentive multipliers) or decreased (for negative incentive multipliers), other 
things equal. 
The reporter is also charged a fee for the total adjustment. The fee increases with 
the total adjustment. 
100 Reports in Each period 
Rather than choose a different adjustment factor every time, reporters choose a 
single adjustment factor that is applied to 100 different reports.  Every report has its 
own randomly-chosen base value and its own randomly-chosen incentive multiplier.  
Your computer screen will show the average payoff for the entire set of 100 reports.   
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Appraiser’s Task 
The appraiser’s task is to estimate the base value for each report as accurately as 
possible.  Specifically, the appraiser is charged based on the square of the difference 
between the estimate and the base value. For example, if the appraiser estimates a 
value of 14, and the base value is 9, the charge will be (14 - 9)2 = 25.  
Instead of choosing different estimate for each report, the appraiser chooses a 
single number, called “reliance,” to come up with an estimate.  For each report, the 
appraiser’s estimate is determined by this equation: 
Appraiser’s Estimate = Reliance x Reported Value 
• If the reporter has chosen an adjustment factor of 0, the appraiser’s best choice 
is select reliance of 100%, because the report is exactly equal to the base value.  
• The higher the reporter’s adjustment factor, the less reliant the appraiser should 
be, because high reports probably indicate that the reporter adjusted upward, 
and low reports probably indicate that the reporter adjusted downward. 
Payoff Calculation 
The reporter’s laboratory payoff for each round is the average payoff of all 100 
reports. The reporter’s laboratory payoff for each report is determined by the equation:  
Reporter’s Payoff = Incentive Multiplier x Appraiser’s Estimate – Cost of 
Adjustment 
The appraiser’s laboratory payoff for each round is also the average payoff of all 
100 reports. The appraiser’s laboratory payoff for each report is determined by the 
equation: 
Appraiser’s Payoff = – (Appraiser’s Estimate – Base Value)2 
Your screen shows the average expected payoff calculated based on your 
expectation of the other player’s strategy and on your own choice in the same way as 
the actual payoff calculation of all 100 reports (shown in yellow at the bottom of your 
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decision making screen).  
You can use the dropdown menus to select different combinations of the other 
player’s strategy you expect and your own strategy to see how your expected payoff is 
affected. However, your expected payoff is calculated based on your expectation of 
the strategy of the other player, which may deviate from the actual strategy played out 
by the other player that determines your actual payoff.  
Converting laboratory payoffs into US dollars 
Your total laboratory payoffs will be converted into US dollars according to the 
following conversion rule: 
USD Winnings = Exchange Rate x (Your Laboratory Payoffs + “Adjustment”) 
You will not learn the exact exchange rate and adjustment. However, there are a 
few facts you can learn. First, the exchange rate is positive, meaning that the more 
laboratory dollars you win, or the fewer you lose, the more USD you get. Second, the 
exchange rate is set to be independent of the performance of the other player in your 
pair. Third, “adjustment” will be different for reporters and appraisers. The exchange 
rate and ‘adjustment’ are set so that the average winnings will be approximately 
US$25 for each person for the session. You will also receive $5 in cash for 
participation when you finish the experiment.  
Summary 
The flow of information and decision making is summarized in Figure 1 below: 
Figure 1: Flow of Information and Decision Making 
Base 
Value
Reporter's 
Incentive
Reporter's 
Adjustment
Weight
Reported Value Appraiser's 
Estimate
Appraiser's 
Incentive
Payoffs
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III: Screen Shots 
A. Decision screen for investors 
B. Decision screen for managers 
 60 
REFERENCES 
Aboody, D, J. Hughes, and J. Liu. 2002. Measuring Value Relevance in a (Possibly) 
Inefficient Market. Journal of Accounting Research 40(4): 965-986. 
Aumann, J. 1976. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics. 6: 1236-1239. 
Bernheim, B. D. 1984. Rationalizable Strategic Behavior. Econometrica. 52: 1007-
1028. 
Bloomfield, R. J. 1994. Learning a mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 25(3): 411. 
Bloomfield, R. J. 1995. Strategic dependence and inherent risk assessments. 
Accounting Review 70(1): 71. 
Bloomfield, R. J. 1997. Strategic Dependence and the Assessment of Fraud Risk: A 
Laboratory Study. (Cover story). Accounting Review 72(4) : 517. 
Binmore, K. 1987. Modeling rational players: part I. Economics and Philosophy. 3: 
179-214. 
Dye, R. A., and S.S. Sridhar. 2004. Reliability-Relevance Trade-Offs and the 
Efficiency of Aggregation. Journal of Accounting Research 42(1): 51-88. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 1980. Concepts Statement No. 2: Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information. 
Hofbauer, J., and K. Sigmund. 1988. The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical 
Systems. London, U.K.: London Mathematical Society.  
Kachelmeier, S. 1996. Do cosmetic reporting variations affect market behavior? A 
laboratory study of the accounting emphasis on unavoidable costs. Review of 
Accounting Studies; 1 (2): 115-140. 
Liang, J., and X. Wen. 2005. Accounting measurement basis, market mispricing, and 
firm investment efficiency. SSRN working paper. 
Maines, L. A., and J. Wahlen. 2005. The nature of accounting information reliability: 
 61 
inferences from archival and experimental research. Working paper, Indiana 
University. 
Moulin, H. 1984. Dominance solvability and Cournot stability. Mathematical Social 
Sciences. 7: 83-102. 
Pearce, D. G. 1984. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. 
Econometrica. 52: 1029-1050. 
Plantin, G., and S. H. Shin. 2005. "Marking to market:  panacea or Pandora’s Box?" 
Working Paper. 
Samuelson, L., and J. Zhang. 1992. Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games. 
Journal of Economic Theory  57: 363-391. 
Sunder, S. 1997. Theory of Accounting and Control, International Thomson 
Publishing, Cincinnati, OH. 
 
 
 62 
CHAPTER II 
Investor Affect and the Credibility of Management 
Disclosures 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The credibility of management disclosures is an important determinant of investor 
reactions to the disclosures (Jennings, 1987). For instance, Kothari (2006) has 
documented that lower credibility of management disclosures is associated with higher 
cost of capital of firms (Kothari, 2006). Given the significant impact of the credibility 
of management disclosures on the financial market, it is of great interest to both 
researchers and practitioners to understand the factors that influence the credibility of 
management disclosures. Mercer (2004) defines disclosure credibility as “investors’ 
perceptions of the believability of a particular disclosure”. However, the existing 
literature has focused primarily on the characteristics of management and disclosures, 
but left out the characteristics of investors as an important input into the perceived 
credibility of management disclosures. The goal of this paper is to investigate how 
investor affect influences their credibility assessments of management disclosures. 
Affect is broadly used here to refer to an evaluative reaction to a stimulus that has 
either positive or negative valence (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). In this study, I look at 
how investor affect influences their choice of information processing strategies and 
information base in judgments and how investor affect interacts with management 
reporting incentives in influencing investors’ information processing and perceived 
disclosure credibility. 
Drawing upon the extant psychology literature on affect and the accounting 
literature on disclosure credibility, I predict that investors will use their affect as a 
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source of information and adopt a heuristic information-processing strategy in a 
positive affective state and a systematic information-processing strategy in a negative 
affective state. In a management earnings disclosure context, this prediction leads to a 
high credibility assessment of a good news disclosure when investors are in a positive 
affective state and vice versa. The awareness of management reporting incentives is 
likely to induce investors to pay more attention to the disclosure and switch to a 
systematic information-processing strategy, which will mitigate the effect of a positive 
affect on information processing. When investors are in a negative affective state, the 
awareness of management reporting incentives will not have an additional effect 
because investors in a negative affective state process information systematically.   
I test the predictions in a pilot experiment where 57 accounting master’s students 
and undergraduate seniors assess the credibility of a positive management earnings 
forecast. Archival research that uses naturally-generated data is unable to detect the 
effects of affect on investor credibility assessments due to the unobservability of 
investor affect and credibility judgments, a lack of control of disclosure content and 
inherent credibility of disclosure, and the self-selection problem. Experimentation 
allows me to control for management disclosure contents and the self-selection 
problem by holding them constant across treatments, to examine the effects of affect 
and management reporting incentives by varying them, and to measure and collect 
process variables that are unobservable in naturally-generated data.  
The experiment manipulates management incentives to misreport and 
experimental payment to participants in a 2X2 between-subjects design. I vary 
experimental payments to participants to induce positive affect in participants who 
receive higher payments and negative affect in participants who receive lower 
payments. The results of the pilot experiment provide some support to the predictions. 
Specifically, I find that participants assess management as more truthful when the 
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management incentive to misreport is low. However, inconsistent with my predictions 
and prior experimental evidence, I find that lower assessments of management 
truthfulness do not result in lower credibility assessments of the management earnings 
forecast. I also find that, contrary to the results in prior psychology literature, positive 
affective states are associated with less heuristic processing of information.  
The pilot study raises several interesting questions to be answered in future 
research. First, the payment manipulation successfully induced certain affective states, 
but not all affective states. Watson and Tellegen (1983) identify two fundamental 
dimensions of affect, strong engagement/disengagement and 
pleasantness/unpleasantness. According to the two-dimensional framework of affect, 
the manipulated affective states locate primarily along the dimension of strong 
engagement/disengagement. My result contradicts prior evidence on the effects of 
affect on information processing, and instead shows that positive affective states are 
associated with more systematic information processing. Given the affect 
manipulation result, it is not clear whether the experiment results indicate that prior 
psychological findings do not generalize in a management disclosure setting or that 
the findings do not generalize to all dimensions of affects. Second, the results do not 
support the general perception that higher management situational incentives lead to 
lower credibility of management disclosures. The results call for more research on the 
interactive effects of the factors that influence the credibility of management 
disclosures. I discuss my future plans to revise the experiment to address the raised 
questions in the conclusion and discussion section. 
Provided that the follow-up experiment answers the above questions, I expect the 
study to contribute to the accounting research on the credibility of management 
disclosures in two ways. First, the paper identifies investor affect as another factor that 
influences the perceived credibility of management and their disclosures.  Second, it 
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shows that that investors’ awareness of management incentives to misreport could 
potentially mitigate the effects of positive affects that cause investors to accept 
management disclosures at face value. I also expect the study to contribute to the 
psychology literature by showing that the findings in prior psychology studies do not 
generalize to all dimensions of affect. The paper calls for a more refined theory on the 
effects of affect.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews relevant literature 
in both psychology and accounting and develops the hypotheses. Section III presents 
an experiment that tests the hypotheses. Section IV discusses the experimental results. 
The last section concludes and discusses future plans to revise and improve the current 
study.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Literature on Affect 
Affect may influence thinking and judgments in two ways: by biasing the 
informational source and by influencing the information-processing strategies (See 
Clore, Schwarz, and Conway, 1994; Wyer, Clore, and Isbell, 1999; Forgas, 2000, for 
reviews).  
On the informational role of affect, a few studies show that affect facilitates the 
recall and use of mood-congruent information. To explain the findings, affect-priming 
theories propose an associative network model of memory and assume that the greater 
availability of mood-related memories, constructs, and associations will influence top-
down interpretive processes in thinking and judgments (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1987). The 
priming of affect-congruent information will, in turn, facilitate affect-congruent 
materials, focus attention on mood-congruent details, help the recall of mood-
consistent details learned in a matching mood, and help the mood-congruent 
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interpretation of ambiguous information. All these effects lead to mood-congruent 
biases in the informational basis of thinking and judgments.  
In a management disclosure situation, the proposed direct and indirect 
informational roles of affect suggest that investors in a positive affective state will 
focus on positive information, interpret information in a positive way, and recall 
positive aspects of the management and disclosure from their memory. The 
informational consequence of positive affect is likely to lead to an overly optimistic 
credibility assessment of management disclosures. On the contrary, negative affect is 
likely to lead to a pessimistic credibility assessment of management disclosures. 
In addition to the informational role, affect is also shown to influence the choice of 
the information-processing strategies. The traditional view proposes a processing 
dichotomy of positive versus negative affect. Positive affect typically leads to a 
simplified, heuristic processing strategy as people seek to maintain their good mood 
(Clark and Isen, 1982). Bad moods are associated with a systematic processing 
strategy as required to repair moods.  Consistent with this view, Bless et al. (1990) 
find that happy subjects were equally persuaded by strong and weak arguments, unless 
explicitly instructed to pay attention to the content of the message, while sad subjects 
were more influenced by strong arguments than by weak arguments. When subjects 
were given a distracting task, the differential persuasive power of strong versus weak 
arguments to sad subjects was mitigated. The results lead to the conclusion that 
subjects in a good mood are less likely to engage in message elaboration than subjects 
in a bad mood. 
Further studies provide findings contradicting this simple view of dichotomy. 
Bless and Fiedler (1995) argue that positive affect does not necessarily lead to 
impairment in processing efficacy. This argument is supported by evidence showing 
that tasks requiring creativity and generative thinking are often facilitated by positive 
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affect (Isen, 1987). Bless proposes that positive affect also promotes a general 
schematic way of thinking and the use of general knowledge and reduces the tendency 
to focus on piecemeal information.  
Forgas (1995), in an attempt to reconcile the contradictory evidence on the effects 
of affect, proposes a multi-process theory, the Affect Infusion Model (AIM). Affect 
infusion refers to the process whereby affective loaded information exerts an influence 
on, and becomes incorporated into cognitive and judgmental processes. Forgas argues 
that people are likely to use heuristic processing strategy when neither stored 
responses nor a motivational goal can guide judgments, and people seek to compute a 
constructive response with minimal effort. Substantive processing strategy is used 
when people need to select, learn, and interpret novel information and relate this 
information to their preexisting knowledge structures in order to construct a response. 
Consistent with his arguments, Clark and Isen (1982) show that negative affect may 
trigger motivated processing in the service of mood repair. In AIM, the relationship 
between information processing strategies and affect infusion is not unidirectional. 
Affect can influence the processes being adopted. Negative moods are associated with 
vigilant, systematic attention to stimulus details, which, in turn, tends to reduce or 
even eliminate judgmental biases (Forgas, 1998). In contrast, positive affect tends to 
increase the likelihood of cognitive mistakes, such as attribution error and memory 
mistakes.  
In summary, psychology research on affect in general suggests that affect may 
influence people’s credibility judgment of a persuasive communication through their 
assessments of the logical coherence of the arguments and the set of knowledge that is 
retrieved and used to assess the plausibility of these arguments. Positive affect is often 
associated with heuristic processing of information and activation of positive 
information. People in a positive affective state are thus more likely to overlook 
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logical inconsistencies in the arguments and assess a higher level of credibility. In 
contrast, negative affect is often associated with more systematic information 
processing and a more thorough evaluation of information. People in a negative 
affective state are less likely to overlook logical inconsistencies in the arguments.  
Literature on Management Disclosure Credibility 
Investors’ reactions to management disclosures are a function of both the 
magnitude of the news contained in the messages and the credibility of the disclosures 
(Jennings, 1987). Due to the importance of the credibility of management disclosures, 
researchers have devoted much effort to identifying the determinants of the credibility 
of management disclosures. Mercer (2004) defines disclosure credibility as “investors’ 
perceptions of the believability of a particular disclosure”. This definition emphasizes 
the distinction between management credibility and investors’ perceived credibility of 
management disclosures. The former refers to the inherent credibility of management, 
yet the latter focuses on investors’ perceptions of management disclosures, which is 
the focus of this paper. Mercer synthesizes the existing literature and identifies four 
factors that influence the perceived credibility of management disclosures (see Mercer, 
2004, for a review on the credibility of management disclosures): 1. management’s 
situational incentives at the time of the disclosure; 2. management’s credibility; 3. the 
degree of external and internal assurance; 4. various characteristics of the disclosure, 
including its precision, venue, timing, amount of supporting information, and inherent 
plausibility.  
Evidence on management situational incentives suggests that investors are 
sensitive to the incentives of management when assessing disclosure credibility. When 
the messages are consistent with the incentives of management, investors are less 
likely to believe the messages. Koch (1999) examines analysts’ reliance on 
management earnings forecasts of financially distressed firms and finds that analysts 
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rely less on the forecasts as the firm’s financial distress increases. Similarly, investors 
are more skeptical about management credibility when positive disclosures are 
provided than when negative disclosures are provided. Hutton et al. (2003) find a 
larger stock price reaction to management disclosures that contain negative news. 
Hassell et al. (1998) document that bad news disclosures result in larger analyst 
forecast revisions. In an experiment, Hirst et al. (2007) show that investors assess a 
lower level of credibility with positive news disclosures from management than with 
negative news disclosures, and this tendency is greater when investors know that the 
management has greater incentives to report optimistically.  
Prior studies that examine the characteristics of disclosures find that the precision 
of disclosures and the amount of supporting information in the disclosures influence 
investors’ perception of the disclosure credibility. Several studies argue and find 
support that investors perceive precise forecasts to be more credible compared to 
imprecise forecasts. Hirst et al. (1999) vary the precision of management forecasts 
(point vs. range) in an experiment and find that investors are more confident when 
relying on more precise forecasts. Management explanations to support their 
disclosures also increase the credibility of disclosures for various reasons. Supporting 
information could be a costly signal to increase investors’ confidence in the credibility 
of the information. Supporting information also increases the ex post verifiability of 
the disclosure and reduces management’s ability to manipulate information ex ante 
(Lundholm, 1999; Hutton, Miller, and Skinner, 2003).  
Hypotheses 
The review of the literature on the credibility of disclosures leads to the following 
hypothesis on the effect of management incentives on the credibility of management 
disclosures. 
H1: Investors assess lower credibility of management good-news disclosures in 
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the presence of management incentives than they do in the absence of management 
incentives. 
Surprisingly, given how important investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility 
are, prior research on the credibility of management disclosures has not considered the 
characteristics of investors, affective states in particular, as inputs into the credibility 
judgments. The implicit assumption seems to be that investor affect does not influence 
credibility judgments systematically.  
The psychology literature on affect suggests that investor affect could be an 
important factor that influences their perceptions of disclosure credibility. As Forgas 
(1995) points out, affective states serve as an important and independent source of 
functional information and input into realistic judgmental and information-processing 
tasks, rather than merely as a source of noise. However, the effects of affect in a 
management setting cannot be presumed. In particular, research has identified two 
primary dimensions of affect, pleasantness/unpleasantness and strong 
engagement/disengagement (Watson and Tellegen, 1985). The two primary 
dimensions of affect categorize affective states into four groups: high positive affect, 
low positive affect, high negative affect, and low negative affect. Several studies 
(Lewinsohn and Mano, 1993; Mano, 1997) suggest that the two affective dimensions 
may have differential effects on information processing. However, prior literature 
often uses the term affect loosely to refer to various affective states and dimensions. It 
is unclear whether the effects of affect documented in psychology and accounting 
literature can be generalized in a management disclosure setting. Due to a lack of 
guidance on potentially differential effects of affective states and dimensions, I use the 
general term affect in the hypotheses and the rest of the paper.  
In the absence of management incentives to misreport, any difference in investor 
assessments of management disclosure credibility is only attributed to the influences 
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of affect on the information base and the information-processing strategy used in 
investor judgments. The effects of affect predict that investors are likely to use their 
affective state as a source of information, which leads to higher credibility assessments 
of disclosures when investors are in a positive affective state than when they are in a 
negative affective state. It also predicts that investors in a positive affective state are 
likely to adopt a heuristic processing strategy, as opposed to a systematic processing 
strategy by investors in a negative affective state. Using a heuristic processing strategy 
weakens investors’ ability to detect logical inconsistencies in management arguments 
and leads investors to overly accepting the messages in management disclosures. The 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis on the effect of investor affect on the 
credibility assessment of management disclosure. 
H2: In the absence of management incentives to misreport, investors assess 
management good-news disclosures as more credible in a positive affective state 
than in a negative affective state. 
In the presence of management incentives to misreport, however, the awareness of 
management incentives will urge investors to seek more information and to scrutinize 
the disclosure more. This effect is likely to mitigate the processing bias due to positive 
affect and restore investors’ sensitivity on the strength and plausibility of management 
disclosures. In a negative affective state, because investors will adopt a systematic 
processing strategy, the awareness of management reporting incentives is unlikely to 
further increase the amount of information processed and improve the accuracy of 
credibility assessment. This leads to the third hypothesis on the interactive effect of 
affect and management reporting incentives. 
H3:  The presence of management incentives to misreport reduces investors’ 
assessments of the credibility of good-news disclosures in a positive affective state 
more than it reduces investors’ assessments in a negative affective state.  
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The hypotheses on the effects of affect and management incentives on the 
credibility of management disclosures are summarized in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
III. EXPERIMENT 
To test these hypotheses, I conducted a pilot experiment with 57 master’s students 
and undergraduate seniors enrolled in accounting programs at a large state university. 
The participants were recruited via classroom announcements. On average, the 
participants had taken over seven accounting and finance classes. Sufficient evidence 
indicates that the subject pool has the necessary knowledge to understand management 
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FIGURE 2.1 
Predicted Effects of Management Compensation Scheme and Investor Affect on the 
Credibility of Management Good-news Disclosures 
 
This figure summarizes the predicted effects of management reporting incentives and 
investor affect on investors’ perceptions of management disclosure credibility. The 
horizontal axis refers to management reporting incentives. The vertical axis records 
investors’ credibility assessments. The solid blue line represents predicted credibility 
assessments of investors in positive affective states. The red dashed line represents 
predicted credibility assessments of investors in negative affective states.  
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reporting incentives, which is required for the manipulation to have the intended 
effects.  
Experimental Design and Task 
The experiment uses 2 x 2 between-subjects design that varies management 
incentives to misreport (low versus high), and investor affect (positive versus 
negative). I focus on good-news forecasts in the experiment because good-news 
forecasts are consistent with management’s general tendency to report optimistically 
and are, therefore, more likely to suffer from credibility issues. In contrast, bad-news 
forecasts are inherently more credible and as a consequence are less affected by 
management situational incentives.  
Using an experiment to examine the effect of investor affect on management 
disclosure credibility has several advantages. First, through experimentation, I am able 
to hold constant information content, forecasting accuracy, and other confounding 
variables that potentially influence disclosure credibility. This would be hard to 
achieve with naturally-generated data where the effects of these confounding variables 
and the effects of affect and management reporting incentives are hard to disentangle. 
Second, experimentation allows me to manipulate investor affect and draw clear 
inferences on the effects of affect on the credibility of management forecasts. In the 
real world, investors’ emotional states are not observable and the sources of their 
emotional states may be correlated with other factors that affect disclosure credibility. 
Therefore, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to test the effect of investor affect on 
information processing and decision making with naturally-generated data. Third, 
experimentation allows me to measure investor credibility judgments separately from 
valuation judgments and to collect processing data from investors, which are 
necessary in order to draw clear inferences on the causal relationship between affect 
and credibility assessments. Finally, experimentation also gives me an opportunity to 
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create scenarios that are rarely observed in the real world (Libby, Nelson, and 
Bloomfield, 2002). Real management disclosures are unlikely to be entirely 
independent from management reporting incentives. By creating scenarios where 
disclosures are not affected by management reporting incentives, I can disentangle the 
effects of affect and management incentives. 
I manipulate investor affect by varying the relative payments of investors in the 
experiment. I randomly assigned participants either positive or negative shares of a 
fictitious company, company A, as their starting share balances. They were then 
informed that the market price of the stock drops. Their positions were closed out at 
the reduced market price. This procedure results in half of the participants receiving 
positive balance of laboratory dollars and the other half receiving negative balance of 
laboratory dollars. All participants were informed that higher balances of laboratory 
dollars translate to higher cash payments at the end of the experiment. The payment 
differences between low and high payment groups averaged 15USD for a thirty-
minute session. The participants who received positive balances were likely to be in a 
more pleasant mood compared to the participants who received negative balances. 
Compared to the traditional ways of inducing affect using mood-laden statements or 
music in the psychology literature, this manipulation resembles more closely what 
investors experience in the real world, and yet still holds other factors, such as self-
efficacy, constant. Participants’ self-efficacy is unlikely to be affected because their 
gains or losses are due to random assignment of shares as opposed to their own 
investment decisions. 
Following the affect manipulation but before measuring participants’ affect, 
participants then assumed the role of investors. They were provided with information 
about Overland Storage, a company that provides data protection solutions. 
Participants in each affect group were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
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low management incentives to report favorably and high management incentives to 
report favorably. Participants in the low management incentives setting were informed 
that the management team of Overland Storage is compensated based on a fixed-salary 
scheme and the compensation does not depend on the company’s net income or stock 
price performance. Participants in the high management incentives setting were 
informed that the management team of Overland Storage is compensated based on a 
bonus scheme, where 80% of their compensation depends on the company’s net 
income and stock price performance. In the real world, there could be many other 
situational incentives management may have that could lead them to manipulate 
financial information. I assume that participants’ beliefs about other management 
incentives will not affect results directionally due to random assignment of 
participants to different treatments (Libby, Nelson, and Bloomfield, 2002).  
The materials presented to participants are based on a real company, Overland 
Storage Inc. The company is chosen based on several criteria. First, the company 
provides a management earnings forecast that contains good news disclosed in a 
relatively wide range. Prior research shows that earnings forecasts in a range format 
are considered to be less credible than forecasts in a point format (Hirst, Koonce, and 
Miller, 1999). Second, the company is a small capitalization company that does not 
have significant news in recent business presses. This reduces the possibility that 
participants might recognize the company and use their information about the 
company from outside of the experiment in the task. In choosing the company, I use 
the First Call database for 2006 January reports that contain quarterly good-news 
earnings forecasts in a range format.   
Each participant was given the background information about Overland Storage 
Inc. and the management earnings forecast. After reading the earnings forecast, 
participants could choose to read the risk factors involved in Overland’s business and 
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the key variables of the company before they proceeded to answer questions. 
Following the materials, participants provided assessments of the credibility of the 
earnings forecast, assessments of the management credibility, estimated true earnings, 
and responses about their cognitive processing.  
As manipulation checks, they then answered questions about their affective states 
and their awareness of the management incentive schemes. I assess participants’ affect 
by asking them to rate their current affective states using mood-descriptive words on 
provided scales. The mood-descriptive words are adopted from the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) developed by Watson, Clark and Tellegen (1988). 
The PANAS consists of two 10-item scales for positive affect and negative affect, 
respectively. Watson and Clark (1994) later expanded the PANAS to measure more 
affective states (the PANAS-X). The PANAS can be used in a cropped version 
(Watson and Clark, 1988). I select 15 items from the PANAS-X to measure 
participants’ affective states. Among the 15 items, 8 items reflect positive emotions: 
Alert, Attentive, Confident, Concentrating, Excited, Happy, Interested, and Proud; 7 
items reflect negative emotions, Angry at self, Dissatisfied with self, Irritable, 
Nervous, Sad, Tired, and Upset10.  
I measure affect after the experimental task for several reasons. First, measuring 
participants’ affect before the task introduces the risk of participants realizing the 
purpose of manipulation. Prior research has shown that when people identify the 
source of their mood that is unrelated to the current task, the effect of mood is 
removed (e.g., Gorn, Goldberg, and Basu, 1993; N. Schwarz and Clore, 1983). 
Second, studies show that transient emotions induced in experiments fade in about 45 
                                                 
10
 The 15 words can be further classified to represent sub-categories of emotions including 
hostility, sadness, joviality, self-assurance, and attentiveness, of which the first two constructs are 
considered as basic negative emotions and the latter three constructs are considered as basic positive 
emotions. 
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minutes. The experimental task is designed so that participants should finish the main 
task within 20 minutes. If the manipulation is successful, measuring affect after the 
task should allow me to detect any difference between treatment groups. However, 
measuring affect after the experimental task might distort participants’ ratings of their 
affective states. First, the manipulated affects may fade after the experimental task and 
reduce the power of detecting a difference. Second, Kida and Smith (1995) argue that 
investors’ affective reactions toward an event are encoded in memory. Therefore, 
participants’ affective states after the experimental task might be affected by both the 
affect manipulation and the valence of earnings forecast. The second is less of a 
concern because participants’ affective reactions to the valence of the earnings 
forecast should not cause a differential reaction by participants in different treatments.  
Before participants were dismissed, they answered a number of demographic 
questions about their prior coursework, investment experience, ethnicity, and gender. 
Dependent Variables  
To measure investors’ assessments of the credibility of the earnings forecast, I 
follow Hirst et al. (2007) to ask participants to assess the credibility and believability 
of the earnings forecast. To gain more insights into the mechanism through which 
affect influences investor judgments, I also ask participants questions about the 
determinants of disclosure credibility identified in Mercer (2004). Specifically, I ask 
participants to assess management credibility, the precision of the earnings disclosure, 
and the amount of supporting information demonstrated by the management. On 
management credibility, I use four questions adapted from Mercer (2005) to measure 
participants’ perceptions of management’s competence, knowledge, trustworthiness, 
and truthfulness. 
To understand better how affect and management reporting incentives influence 
participants’ decision making, I also measure participants’ cognitive processing. First, 
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I ask participants to recall any information they remember from the earnings forecast 
and other information provided. I ask this question first to avoid contamination of the 
responses by the other questions. Second, I ask them to provide their subjective 
opinions on the amount of effort they spent on reading the materials and making the 
assessments. Third, I also record the amount of time participants spent on reading the 
forecast and related information, and the amount of time spent on making assessments. 
The three measures provide corroborative evidence on the cognitive effort participants 
exert in the task. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
 Responses to the manipulation check question on management incentive scheme 
indicate that all participants but one successfully identified the correct management 
incentive scheme. Excluding the participant who failed to recall management incentive 
scheme does not change any result reported.  
Responses to questions about participants’ affective states, however, do not 
generate significant differences overall between low and high payment groups. Further 
analysis on individual affective states indicates that low and high payment groups 
differ in participants’ alertness, attentiveness, confidence, concentration, and 
irritability. The manipulated affective states are highlighted in bold red in Panel A of 
Figure 2.2. The statistics are presented in Panel B of Figure 2.2. This manipulation 
check was completed after participants performed the forecast credibility task. Several 
factors could have influenced the effectiveness of the manipulation check. First, 
subjects’ affect was not measured immediately after the manipulation and could have 
dissipated after the completion of the task. Second, participants’ affective states are 
likely to vary before participating in the experiment. Third, participants’ affect could 
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Panel A: The two-dimensional framework of affect 
 
Panel B: Statistics of successfully manipulated affective states 
 
 High Payment 
group 
Low Payment 
group 
P-value (two-
tailed) 
Alert 4.034 3.250 0.001 
Attentive 4.000 3.536 0.019 
Confident  3.655 3.250 0.078 
Concentrating 4.276 3.643 0.002 
Irritable 1.241 1.607 0.076 
  
FIGURE 2.2 
Results of Affect Manipulation  
 
This figure presents the results of the affect manipulation. Affect is measured 
based on participants’ responses to the 15 affect words selected from PANAS-X after 
they have finished the task of assessing disclosure credibility. In panel A, the 15 words 
are organized in the Watson and Tellegen (1985) framework of the two-dimensional 
affective space. The two dimensions are pleasantness/unpleasantness and strong 
engagement/disengagement. Participants were required to provide responses to each 
word on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = very slightly or not at all and 5 = extremely. The 
words highlighted in red are successfully manipulated. The statistics are presented in 
panel B. The p-values are all two-tailed. 
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have been influenced by the valence of management earnings forecast. The news 
valence of disclosures is shown to influence investors’ affective evaluation of a 
company (Mercer, 2005). All three possibilities could reduce the statistical power to 
detect a difference between treatment groups.  
Credibility Effects 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that investors will assess lower credibility of good-news 
disclosures when management compensation is highly associated with the company’s 
earnings performance. Hypothesis 2 predicts that investors who are in a positive 
affective state will assess higher credibility of good-news disclosures compared to 
investors who are in a negative affective state. The tendency to assess higher 
credibility in a positive affective state will be mitigated when the management 
compensation scheme is highly associated with the company’s earnings performance, 
as predicted in hypothesis 3.  
To test the predictions, I first conduct a two-way ANOVA with management 
compensation scheme (Incentive) and participants’ payment group (Payment) as 
independent variables and participants’ assessments of the believability and credibility 
of the earnings forecast as the dependent variables. The results are presented in Table 
2.1. Surprisingly, the ANOVA result shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference on the credibility assessments of the earnings forecast between the two 
management compensation schemes. The result is inconsistent with prior evidence in 
the archival literature and other experimental studies that investors assess lower 
credibility of a management disclosure when the management has high situational 
incentives to distort the disclosure. Results on the effect of Payment and the 
interactive effect of Payment and Incentive do not generate statistical significance 
either.  
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TABLE 2.1 
Effects of Management Compensation Scheme and Participants’ Payment on 
Credibility Assessments of Earnings Disclosure and Management 
 
The table presents the effects of management compensation scheme (Incentive) 
and participants’ payment (Payment) on the credibility assessments of the earnings 
forecast and management. The credibility assessments of the earnings forecast are 
based on participants’ responses to two questions on the believability and credibility 
of the earnings forecast. Participants’ responses to the two questions are summed to 
form a composite measure of disclosure credibility. To measure the credibility 
assessments of management credibility, I follow Mercer (2005) to collect subjects’ 
responses to four questions on management’s competence, knowledge, 
trustworthiness, and truthfulness. Responses were recorded and summed to form a 
composite measure of management’s credibility.  
 
 Low Payment High Payment 
Low Incentive   
Disclosure credibility 10.214 10.769 
Management 
credibility 
0.286 1.462 
High Incentive Low Payment High Payment 
Disclosure credibility 10.214 9.000 
Management 
credibility 
-2.286 -1.267 
     
P-value Payment Incentive Interaction 
Disclosure credibility 0.697 0.298 0.298   
Management 
credibility 
0.506 0.112 0.962 
 
To investigate the potential reasons for the lack of consistency of the results with 
the existing literature, I further look at the determinants of disclosure credibility 
identified in prior literature. Four groups of factors are identified to determine 
disclosure credibility (Mercer, 2004): management situational incentives, management 
credibility, external and internal assurance, and disclosure characteristics. In the 
experiment, I elicit participants’ responses on their perceived precision of the earnings 
forecast, the amount of supporting information demonstrated by the management, and 
the perceived management credibility.  I first examine whether the management 
compensation scheme and participants’ payment group influence participants’ 
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perceptions of the determinants of disclosure credibility. The participants provide 
assessments of four aspects of management credibility: management competence, 
knowledge, trustworthiness, and truthfulness. The four components are adopted from 
Mercer (2005). I use ANOVA to examine the effects of Incentive and Payment on the 
determinants of disclosure credibility. Results are shown in Table 2.2. Participants’ 
perceived truthfulness of management is significantly lower when management 
compensation scheme is highly dependent on the firm’s earnings performance. 
However, management compensation scheme does not have an effect on the other 
components of management credibility. Neither does it influence the perceived 
precision of the earnings forecast nor the amount of supporting information 
demonstrated in the forecast. Participants’ payment group has no effects on any of the 
factors examined.  
I further examine the possibility that variances in participants’ perceptions prior to 
the experiment reduce the statistical power of detecting a difference. I conduct an 
ANCOVA with the credibility assessments of the earnings forecast as the dependent 
variable. In addition to Incentive and Payment, I include perceived precision, 
management’s demonstration of supporting information, and perceived truthfulness of 
the management as additional independent variables to control for individual 
variances. The ANCOVA result is presented in Table 2.3. The result does not show 
significant effects of Incentive and Payment on the perceived credibility of the 
earnings forecast after controlling for individual variances in the other determinants of 
disclosure credibility. Consistent with Mercer’s model, I find significant associations 
between the credibility assessments of the earnings forecast and the controlled 
variables. Credibility assessments are higher when participants believe the precision of 
the forecast is higher (p = 0.0347), when participants believe the management 
provides more supporting information (p-value = 0.1484), and when participants think 
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TABLE 2.2  
Effects of Management Compensation Scheme and Participants’ Payment on the 
Determinants of Disclosure Credibility 
 
This table reports the effects of management compensation scheme (Incentive) and 
participants’ payment (Payment) on the determinants of disclosure credibility. The 
determinants of disclosure credibility examined include perceived management 
credibility, perceived precision in management information, and the amount of 
supporting information demonstrated by the management. The p-values are two-tailed. 
 
 Low Payment High Payment 
Low Incentive   
Management 
truthfulness 
4.857 4.462 
Precision 4.429 4.462 
Demonstration 3.571 3.923 
High Incentive Low Payment High Payment 
Management 
truthfulness 
5.500 6.000 
Precision 4.214 4.600 
Demonstration 4.500 4.067 
    
 
P-value Payment Incentive Interaction 
Management 
truthfulness 
0.857 0.071 0.453 
Precision 0.722 0.949 0.764 
Demonstration 0.949 0.399 0.536 
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the management is more truthful (p-value = 0.0304).
 
 TABLE 2.3 
Analyses on the Determinants of Disclosure Credibility 
 
Panel A presents the result of an ANCOVA analysis that examines the effects of 
management compensation (Incentive) and participants’ payment (Payment) on 
participants’ credibility assessments of the earnings forecast, after controlling for 
individual variations in the perceived precision of management’s beliefs (Precision), 
the amount of supporting evidence to the disclosure (Demonstration), and the 
perceived truthfulness of the management (Truthfulness). Panel B presents a 
regression analysis that examines the association between credibility assessments of 
the earnings forecast and Precision, Demonstration, and Truthfulness. 
 
Panel A: Results on the ANCOVA analysis 
Dependent variable: the composite measure of disclosure credibility 
 Incentive Payment  Precision Demonstration Truthfulness 
P-value 0.4473 0.5510 0.0347 0.1484 0.0304 
 
Panel B: Results on the regression analysis 
Dependent variable: the composite measure of disclosure credibility 
 Precision Demonstration Truthfulness 
Coefficient 0.409 0.233 0.402 
P-value 0.0385 0.1761 0.0108 
 
To provide additional assurance that the results of the ANOVA and ANCOVA 
analyses accurately portray the data, I also conduct a path analysis that tests the cause-
and-effect relations among the variables simultaneously. The model I test is presented 
in Figure 2.3. In the model, I include three determinants identified in mercer (2004) 
that are relevant to this study. The three determinants are management situational 
incentives, management credibility, and certain disclosure characteristics. In addition 
to the three determinants identified in prior literature, I also hypothesize that investor 
affect may influence investors’ perceived disclosure credibility directly or indirectly 
through influencing the other determinants. In Mercer’s framework and prior studies, 
management credibility seems to be an exogenous variable that influences disclosure 
credibility. However, management prior forecast accuracy is determined by 
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FIGURE 2.3 
Predicted Effects of Management Incentives and Participants’ Payment on 
Disclosure Credibility  
 
The following figure presents the hypothesized relationships among the 
manipulated variables (IV), mediating variables (MV), and primary dependent 
variable (DV). The model is adapted from Mercer (2004). As in Mercer (2004), 
disclosure credibility is determined by management situational incentives, 
management credibility, and various disclosure characteristics. In addition to the 
three determinants, I also hypothesize that investor affect may influence disclosure 
credibility directly or indirectly via its influences on the other determinants. In my 
study, I manipulate management reporting incentives and payments to participants 
and examine their direct and indirect effects on disclosure credibility. 
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management incentives over the long term. Thus, I predict the effect of management 
situational incentives may also influence disclosure credibility indirectly via its effect 
on management credibility. A test of the overall goodness of fit of the model generates 
a Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) of 0.9152. I confirm the model’s goodness of fit with a 
Chi-Square test (P-value = 0.0004). The model’s goodness-of-fit tests indicate that the 
model describes the data well. 
The results of path analysis are consistent with the ANOVA and ANCOVA 
analyses, as presented in Figure 2.4. The affect manipulation is significantly 
associated with the variations in participants’ affective states, but is not significantly 
associated with the perceived disclosure credibility either directly or indirectly through 
influencing participants’ affect or other determinants of disclosure credibility. The 
management incentive manipulation is significantly associated with the perceived 
management credibility and the perceived management credibility is significantly 
associated with the perceived disclosure credibility. But the relationship between 
management reporting incentives and disclosure credibility is not significant. In 
addition, consistent with prior evidence, the perceived precision of the earnings 
forecast and amount of supporting information to the earnings forecast are positively 
correlated with the perceived disclosure credibility. However, the relationship between 
the perceived amount of supporting information and disclosure credibility is only 
weakly significant.  
One potential reason for failing to find statistical significance on the hypothesized 
results is that the experiment may not have enough power to detect statistical 
significance due to the data size. To investigate this possibility, I conduct a power 
analysis to arrive at the necessary sample sizes in order to achieve a significance level 
of 0.05 (one-tailed) and a power level of 0.7. The analysis indicates that given the 
specified significance and power levels the required sample size for detecting the 
 87 
(0.61,  
 
t= 3.62) 
Disclosure 
Credibility (DV) 
Management 
Reporting 
Incentives (IV) 
Management 
Credibility 
(MV) 
Disclosure 
characteristics: Precision 
(MV) 
Disclosure 
characteristics: Amount 
of supporting 
information (MV) 
Participants’ 
payment (IV) 
Affect 
(MV) 
(2.32, t=3.36) 
(0.26, t=1.58) 
(0.42, t=2.43) 
(-1.06, t= -1.84) 
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t= -0.12) 
(-0.71, t=-0.59) 
FIGURE 2.4 
Results of Path Analysis on the Effects of Management Compensation Scheme 
and Participants’ Payment on Disclosure Credibility 
 
This figure presents the empirical results of a path analysis on the effects of 
management reporting incentives and participants’ payment on disclosure 
credibility. A path analysis tests the cause-and-effect relationships simultaneously 
among the independent variables, mediating variables, and the ultimate dependent 
variable. The full predicted model is presented in Figure 1. The links between Affect 
and Disclosure Characteristics are omitted in the path analysis because of 
insignificance of the relationships. The coefficients and t-statistics of results are 
presented on the corresponding links. Statistically significant links are highlighted in 
red. The Goodness of Fit Index of this model is 0.9152, indicating an overall fit of 
the model. It is confirmed by a Chi-Square test with a p-value less than 0.0004. 
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effect of management reporting incentives on disclosure credibility is 250, and the 
required sample size for detecting the effect of participants’ payment is over 1000. 
Varying required significance and power levels does not reduce the required sample 
sizes significantly. Therefore, it is possible that I do not find statistical significance of 
some of the tests due to limited sample size. I discuss a remedy for this issue in the 
discussion of future research plan in the conclusion and discussion section. 
In addition to the power issue, there are two other possibilities for the lack of 
association between management compensation scheme and participants’ credibility 
assessments of the earnings forecast. First, participants may have perceived the 
earnings forecast to be relatively precise and well supported. Therefore, management 
reporting incentives do not translate into management disclosure credibility. Hirst et 
al. (2007) show that management reporting incentives have a greater influence on 
investors’ perceived credibility of disclosures when the management has greater 
opportunities to manipulate the disclosure. Specifically, they find that the perceived 
disclosure credibility is less affected when the disclosure is more disaggregated and 
supported by quantitative evidence.  
Second, the inconsistency with prior experimental studies could be due to different 
experimental stimuli used in the experiment. I compare the information provided in 
my experiment with the materials used in Mercer (2005) that examines management 
disclosure credibility. Similar to my experiment, Mercer (2005) provided participants 
with the background information of the company including excerpts from 
management’s discussion and analysis and historical financial statement data. 
Participants were informed of the consensus analyst forecast for the company. 
Participants then received a voluntary disclosure from management that includes a 
point earnings forecast higher than the current consensus analyst forecast. In my 
experiment, participants also received the background information of the company and 
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a voluntary disclosure from the management that includes a range earnings forecast 
higher than the current consensus analyst forecast. The major difference is that I also 
provided risk factors associated with Overland Storage’s business. The original 
purpose of providing risk information is to warn participants of the possibility that the 
company might fail to achieve the earnings forecast in the future. To the extent that 
participants may view the risk information as part of the management’s prior 
disclosures, the risk information may lend credibility to the earnings forecast and 
reduce the effects of the manipulations on the credibility assessments. I discuss my 
plans to revise the experiment in the conclusion and discussion section. 
The results on the effects of affect do not support the hypotheses either. To gain 
more insights, I further look at the process variables in participants’ information 
processing and decision making.  
Processing Variables 
The predictions in hypotheses 2 and 3 are based on the prior psychology studies on 
the effects of affect on information processing. The hypotheses predict that 
participants in the high payment group are likely to be in a positive affective state, and 
therefore, would be more likely to use a heuristic information processing style 
compared to the low payment group. A heuristic processing strategy is shown to be 
associated with a lower amount of effort and time spent on processing information and 
decision making. I test the predictions by examining the amount of time participants 
spent on reading the disclosure and related information, participants’ subjective 
assessments of their efforts, and their decision time. I use an ANOVA with Payment 
and Incentive as independent variables and the total amount of time spent on reading 
the materials, subjective assessments of mental effort, and total amount of decision 
time as dependent variables.  
The results are presented in Table 2.4. The ANOVA results indicate that the 
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TABLE 2.4 
Effects of Management Compensation Scheme and Participants’ Payment on 
Information Processing 
 
The table presents the effects of management compensation scheme and 
participants’ payment on subjective effort level, total time spent on reading earnings 
disclosure and related company information (View Time), total time spent on making 
decisions (Decision Time), and the sum of View Time and Decision Time. Subjective 
effort level is measured based on participants’ responses on an eleven-point Likert 
scale with endpoints labeled 1 = low effort and 11 = high effort. View time is 
measured as the sum of time participants spent on reading the general information 
about the company, the company’s earnings disclosure, the key variables of the 
company, and the risk factors of the company. Total Time is measured as the total 
amount of time spent on reading information and answering questions. All p-values 
are two tailed. 
 
 Low Payment High Payment 
Low Incentive   
Subjective effort 7.286 7.846 
View time 261.411 282.459 
Decision time 223.560 261.738         
Total time 484.971 544.197 
High Incentive Low Payment High Payment 
Subjective effort 6.357 7.400 
View time 301.420 348.589 
Decision time 219.025 273.353       
Total time 520.444 621.942 
    
  
P-value Payment Incentive Interaction 
Subjective effort 0.063 0.110 0.570 
Total time 0.071 0.886 0.745 
View time 0.226 0.062 0.641 
Decision time 0.066 0.886 0.745 
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participants in the high management compensation scheme spent 53 seconds more in 
processing the information compared to the participants in the low management 
compensation scheme (p-value = 0.062). The result is consistent with my prediction 
that high management reporting incentives will induce investors to use a systematic 
information processing strategy. The psychology literature provides evidence that 
participants in a positive affective state tend to avoid exerting much effort that could 
disrupt their positive affect. Contrary to the hypothesis, the results show that the 
participants in the high payment group report a higher level of mental effort compared 
to the participants in the low payment group (p-value = 0.063). The higher level of 
subjective effort in the high payment group could be attributed to two possibilities. 
The first possibility is that participants in a positive affective state have lower 
tolerance for effort. Therefore, they report a higher level of mental effort even when 
the objective level of effort could be no different than the amount of effort exerted by 
the participants in a negative affective state. The other possibility is that participants in 
a positive affective state indeed exert higher levels of effort than participants in a 
negative affective state. To distinguish between the two possibilities, I also compare 
the information processing time and the amount of decision time for the two payment 
groups.  
The results on the information processing time and decision time are more 
consistent with the second possibility, with high payment group spending more time 
on processing the disclosure information and on making decisions (only the p-value 
for decision time is significant though). The analysis suggests that higher likelihood of 
the second possibility that participants in a positive affective state exert more effort 
and scrutinize more in processing the information and making decisions. The results 
contradict prior findings in the psychology literature.  
Prior literature on the effects of affect on information processing and decision 
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making does not clearly differentiate between different dimensions of affective states. 
It is likely that the effects documented in prior studies are driven by certain 
dimensions of affect that are not manipulated in this pilot experiment. In particular, as 
Figure 3 shows, the affective states successfully manipulated in the experiment locate 
primarily along the dimension of strong engagement/disengagement. It is likely that 
prior evidence in psychology on the effects of affect requires an activation of certain 
dimensions of affect that are not manipulated in this experiment. If it is indeed the 
case, the results of this study call for a more refined theory on the effects of different 
affect dimensions on information processing and decision making.  
 
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Conclusions 
In this study, I conduct a pilot experiment to examine the effects of affect on 
investors’ information processing and assessments of the credibility of management 
disclosures as well as the interaction of such effect with management reporting 
incentives. The hypotheses are based on the psychology literature on affect and the 
accounting literature on management disclosure credibility. I predict that investors in 
positive affective states use a heuristic information processing strategy and assess 
higher credibility of management disclosures, and that this JDM effect of affect is 
mitigated by the presence of management reporting incentives. In the pilot study, I 
successfully manipulated participants’ alertness, attentiveness, confidence, 
concentration, and irritability by varying payments to participants. Inconsistent with 
my predictions, participants in the high payment group spent more time on 
information processing and decision making than participants in the low payment 
group. The difference in information processing strategies does not lead to a difference 
in the assessments of management disclosure credibility. Participants assess a lower 
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level of management truthfulness when management compensation scheme is highly 
associated with the earnings performance. However, inconsistent with the prediction 
and prior literature, lower assessments of management truthfulness do not result in 
lower assessments of management disclosure credibility.  
The results indicate that prior literature on the differential effects of positive versus 
negative affects on information processing and decision making may not be 
generalizable to all dimensions of affect. Future research should refine the effects of 
specific dimensions of affect on information processing and decision making. The 
study extends the existing accounting literature on management disclosure credibility 
by showing that when the management has high incentives to misreport, investors do 
not simply discount the disclosures, but also scrutinize the disclosures more carefully.  
The pilot experiment leaves several important questions unanswered. First, it is not 
clear whether the results indicate that the findings on affect in psychology do not 
generalize in a management disclosure setting or that the findings do not generalize to 
all dimensions of affect. Second, the results show that lower management credibility 
does not necessarily lead to lower credibility of management disclosures. It is not clear 
whether this result, contradictory to prior studies, is due to the effects of other 
determinants of disclosure credibility or due to a low statistical power to detect a 
difference. 
Plans for Future Research 
Given the results of the pilot study, I plan to make the following revisions in future 
research to achieve better experimental controls and address the questions raised.  
One possible reason for failing to find statistical significance in the results is that 
there may be significant variances in participants’ information processing styles and 
emotions before the experiment. To achieve better controls over individual variances 
in information processing and decision making, I plan to use a pretest-posttest design 
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where participants provide assessments about two disclosures, one before affect 
manipulation, and the other after the manipulation. A pretest-posttest design provides 
changes as dependent and independent variables that are less subject to variances 
between individuals, and therefore should increase statistical power.  
Another issue raised in the pilot experiment is whether the exiting findings on 
affect in the psychology literature can be generalized to all affect dimensions. To test 
potential differential effects of different dimensions of affects on information 
processing, I plan to manipulate affect using both the method in the psychology 
literature and the payment method in this study. The method used in the psychology 
literature has been shown to successfully induce affective states primarily along the 
pleasantness/unpleasantness dimension and the payment method used in the pilot 
study is shown to influence primarily affective states along the strong 
engagement/disengagement dimension. By manipulating the activation of different 
dimensions of affect, I can examine whether different dimensions of affect have 
differential influences on information processing.  
The pilot experiment fails to replicate the empirical finding that management 
reporting incentives are associated with investors’ assessments of disclosure 
credibility. One possibility is that I provided supplementary information to the 
earnings disclosure. Providing supplementary information could have increased the 
credibility of the earnings disclosure despite management reporting incentives. 
Providing supplementary information could also have increased information load on 
participants and added noise in their responses. In the future experiment, I plan to 
follow more closely the prior experimental studies by providing only background 
information and earnings forecasts in order to increase comparability and consistency 
with prior studies.  
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APPENDIX 
Experimental Materials 
The appendix contains the materials about Overland Storage used in the 
experiment and some of the experimental questions. Each participant reviews the 
general information about Overland Storage and the Overland Storage’s earnings 
forecast. The participants could choose whether to view the key variables and the risk 
factors of the company before they proceeded to answer questions. 
 
1. General Information about Overland Storage 
Overland Storage, Inc. (Overland) is a provider of data protection solutions 
designed for backup and recovery to ensure business continuity. The Company sells its 
products on an indirect basis, primarily through three channels or types of customers, 
such as original equipment manufacturers, distributors and value-added resellers. End-
users of its products include small and midsize businesses, as well as divisions and 
operating units of large multi-national corporations, governmental organizations, 
universities and other non-profit institutions. Overland's products are used in a range 
of industry sectors, including financial services, healthcare, retail, manufacturing, 
telecommunications, broadcasting, and research and development. Its products are 
sold world-wide in the Americas, EMEA (Europe, Middle East, Africa) and Asia 
Pacific. Approximately 56.5% of the Company's revenue is generated internationally, 
primarily in Europe. 
 
2. Overland Storage Earnings Forecast 
On Jan. 10, 2006, Overland Storage raised financial guidance for Fiscal Years 
2007 and 2008 to incorporate expected benefits of new OEM contracts.   
Jan. 10, 2006 – Overland Storage, Inc. (NasdaqNM: OVRL) today raised financial 
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guidance for its fiscal years ending June 30, 2007 and 2008.  Incorporated in this new 
guidance is the impact of two new OEM contracts: a software license agreement for 
REO Protection OSTM and a supply agreement for the company’s new tape 
automation product currently under development.  
Overland now expects fiscal 2007 revenue to be in the range of $280 to $285 
million.  Fiscal 2008 revenue is expected to be in the range of $320 to $330 million.  
GAAP earnings per diluted share are expected to be $0.22 to $0.27 in fiscal 2007 and 
$0.62 to $0.72 in fiscal 2008.   
“Based on new OEM business, we are raising our earnings guidance for fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008, with expectations that results will almost double our previous 
non-GAAP earnings guidance for these periods.  Additionally, we have taken a further 
step to reduce a portion of the execution risk in our model by lowering the expected 
revenue contributions from our new ULTAMUS™ product over the next 18 months.  
Our operations and engineering teams are working diligently to support these new 
customers and products, and it is critical that we make the necessary investments in 
fiscal 2006 to drive the business in subsequent years.  We are also pursuing a number 
of other OEM opportunities that could provide incremental revenue and operating 
profit contribution and leverage our new product investments,” said Christopher 
Calisi, president and chief executive officer. 
 
3. Some key variables of Overland Storage 
Number of Employees:  360   
Fiscal Year Ending Date:  6/30/06   
Market Capitalization (in millions):  $55.07   
Percent Owned by Institutions:  68.90%   
Shares Outstanding (in millions):  12.84   
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Number of Institutional Shareholders:  68   
 
4. Potential risks 
The information contained in this news release consists of forward-looking 
statements that involve risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to 
predict. Such forward-looking statements are not guarantees of performance and the 
company’s actual results could differ materially from those contained in such 
statements.  
Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include  
a. risks and uncertainties associated with the company’s acquisition of Zetta 
Systems, Inc.,  
b. including possible integration difficulties and successful execution of the 
business plan related to the acquisition;  
c. possible delays in new product introductions and shipments by the company 
including the new ULTAMUS line and the new tape automation platform currently 
under development,  
d. including versions subject to the company’s new OEM contracts;  
e. possible delays in enhancements to the company’s REO line;  
f. market acceptance of the company’s new product offerings;  
g. the timing and market acceptance of new product introductions by competitors;  
h. the speed at which HP transitions from the products it currently buys from the 
company to its next-generation products to be purchased from another vendor;  
i. delays, unbudgeted expenses, inefficiencies and production problems that may 
result from the transition of manufacturing to Sanmina-SCI;  
j. worldwide information technology spending levels; unexpected shortages of 
critical components;  
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k. rescheduling or cancellation of customer orders; loss of a major customer;  
l. the timing and amount of licensing royalties;  
m. general competition and price pressures in the marketplace;  
n. the company’s ability to control costs and expenses;  
o. and general economic conditions. 
 
5. Experimental Questions: 
1) The perceived credibility of the earnings forecast is measured with the following 
two questions. 
a) Please indicate how believable the provided earnings forecast is. 
b) Please indicate how credible the provided earnings forecast is. 
2) The supporting information demonstrated in the earnings disclosure is measured 
with the following question. 
a) Please indicate how clearly the management demonstrates how they would 
achieve the forecast. 
3) The perceived precision of the earnings forecast is measured with the following 
question. 
a) Please indicate how precise you think the management’s beliefs are about the 
future performance of the company. 
4) The perceived management credibility is measured with the following four 
questions. The four questions are adopted from Mercer (2005). 
Please indicate to what extent each of the following 4 statements reflects your 
belief.  
a) I believe that the management of Overland Storage is very competent at 
providing financial disclosures. 
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b) I believe that the management of Overland Storage has little knowledge of the 
factors involved in providing useful disclosures. 
c) I believe that the management of Overland Storage is very trustworthy. 
d) I believe that the management of Overland Storage may not be truthful in their 
financial disclosures. 
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